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Gulf. On the other hand, Beijing views the entire Gulf as an “extension of
China’s neighbouring areas” (Cafiero and Wagner 2017 ; Zhu 2010 ).
China became a net oil importer in 1993 and this intensified its engage-
ments with the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia (Pant 2006 ). China depends
heavily upon the region for its energy security, and its overall dependency
on oil imports is expected to rise to 77 per cent of its consumption by
2020 (Slav 2017 ) and Saudi Arabia is its biggest supplier (Staff 2017a).
Besides energy, China has an enormous trade and economic interest in the
Kingdom. Though Saudi Arabia looks to both India and China favourably
and is building stronger ties with them, the latter is far ahead through its
participation in mega projects in Saudi Arabia. During the visit of Chinese
Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli in August 2017, both sides established a joint
US$20 billion investment fund and signed many mega economic project
estimated at US$70 billion (Gao 2017 ).
Like most countries of the world, China is the largest trading partner of
Saudi Arabia and also its biggest oil importer. In recent times, both have
improved their defence and security ties. Between 2008 and 2011, for
example, the Kingdom bought weapons worth US$700 million from
China (Jin 2016 ). In August 2017, both signed an agreement to cooper-
ate in nuclear energy. This is a significant development as the Kingdom has
been trying to enhance its nuclear expertise as it fears that the nuclear deal
would result in Iran acquiring nuclear weapons capability (Said 2017 ).
The King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-CARE),
the national body responsible for the nuclear programme, has been hold-
ing consultations with Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), especially the US,
Japan, China, South Korea and Russia, and had elicited a favourable
response from South Korea and China (Staff 2011 ). During Vice-Premier
Gaoli’s visit in mid-2017, the state nuclear project developer China
National Nuclear Corp (CNNC) signed a memorandum of understanding
with the Saudi Geological Survey (SGS) “to explore and assess uranium
and thorium resources” in the Kingdom (Staff 2017b).
India does not seem to be perturbed by the Sino-Saudi economic
engagements, but the growing Chinese strategic interests in the region
and connectivity projects are a challenge, especially when the US influence
in the region is on the decline (Al-Tamimi 2012 , 6). Though Saudi Arabia
does not directly come under the OBOR initiative, a week before the May
2017 meeting of the Belt and Road Forum (BRF), Chinese ambassador in
Riyadh Li Huaxin observed that by connecting the OBOR and the Saudi
Vision 2030 “together, it will create very good opportunities for both sides
P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR