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accompanied by the notions of territorial nationalism and not religious
identities or loyalties. In the aftermath of the demise of the Ottoman
Empire, pan- Islamism emerged as a political rhetoric for narrow and
immediate goals than an attempt to bring the Muslims of the world
under one political authority. The Muslims living in different socio-polit-
ical conditions are no more united as the European Christians found out
a few centuries earlier. A host of intra-Islamic political contests, rivalries
and tensions both during Nehru’s time and later on challenge the argu-
ments of a pan-Islamic threat.
Notwithstanding these, Nehru’s views on Saudi Arabia were coloured
by the Pakistan factor and the potential damage it would have upon India’s
interest in the Middle East. Lacking ideological convergence between a
secular and inclusive India and an exclusivist conservative Wahhabi ideol-
ogy of al-Saud, his engagements with the Kingdom were limited and did
not go beyond diplomatic niceties. There were formal diplomatic relations,
commercial transactions and the continued flow of haj pilgrims but politi-
cally Nehru was drawn closer to Nasser and found intellectual comfort in
secular Arab nationalism and its cascading sway upon the Arab masses
until the mid-1960s. Though Riyadh was part of the emerging Third
World consensus, the Non-alignment was primarily the outcome of the
Nehru-Nasser-Tito triumvirate.
Nehru’s unqualified endorsement enhanced Nasser’s popularity both
inside Egypt and in the region. This, in turn, made Saudi Arabia suspicious
of India’s motives and intentions. With Pakistan’s repeated overtures for an
Islamic bloc, Riyadh primarily saw Nehru as a friend of Nasser and Egypt
while New Delhi viewed Saudi Arabia primarily as a friend of Pakistan. In
short, each saw the other as the friend of their immediate rival and threat.
Such a narrow view of the other, despite considerable interest convergence,
did not help Indo-Saudi bilateral relations.
ConClUsion
As with other aspects of the foreign policy, Nehru’s approach laid the foun-
dations of India’s priority and understanding of Saudi Arabia. He was con-
cerned with containing the influence of Pakistan in the Kingdom and in
the broader Middle East; countering the negative fallouts of pan-Islamism,
especially over the Kashmir issue; and maintaining a transactional approach
towards haj and bilateral trade with Saudi Arabia. These trends and
P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR