India\'s Saudi Policy - P. R. Kumaraswamy, Md. Muddassir Quamar

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serious disagreements; while the official narrative maintained that it was
for India, Islamabad argued that its consent was for “the representatives of
Indian Muslims to which President Yahya Khan had agreed earlier”
(Akhtar 1969 , 336).
Facing domestic ire, Yahya Khan capitalized on the presence of the
non-Muslim Indian diplomat in the Islamic conference and threatened to
boycott it even after the arrival of the Muslim minister from India. The
conference which was meant to discuss the Muslim anger over the al-Aqsa
fire spent its second day in fire-fighting the Indo-Pakistan differences.
Mediatory efforts by King Faisal and others were futile and it was sug-
gested that India would be represented in a non-official capacity. To avoid
further embarrassment, India chose to ‘withdraw’ from the conference.
The Rabat episode is often remembered and recollected for its fiasco,
and in the words of veteran journalist A. G. Noorani it “ranks as a humili-
ating diplomatic debacle” (Noorani 2010 ). The government headed by
Indira Gandhi was cornered by the opposition in parliament and was
almost censured. The Indian anger was directed at the host Morocco for
its inept handling and at King Hussein of Jordan, who was spearheading
the Pakistani position. As a response to the fiasco, New Delhi withdrew its
ambassador and chargé d’affaires respectively from Rabat and Amman.
India was appreciative of King Faisal’s unsuccessful efforts to ameliorate
the situation and convince Pakistan towards ensuring India’s continued
participation.
There were occasional calls that India should reconsider its position
vis- à- vis the Islamic forum and could even seek an observer status, if not a
full membership (Pasha 1995 , 158–59; Imam 1994 ).^4 However, the
Rabat episode made India wary of the OIC and as discussed in a later
chapter the organization becoming the handmaid of Pakistan on Kashmir
only worsened things. Primarily due to the Rabat episode, since 1969
India has avoided international political conferences which are explicitly
Islamic.
The pro-Pakistani sentiments of the Middle East, especially Saudi
Arabia, came to the forefront in 1971 during the Bangladesh War, a major
milestone in India’s politico-diplomatic history. On 25 March that year
the Pakistani military junta headed by Yahya Khan unleashed the violence


(^4) On the other hand, Hamid Ansari, former Indian ambassador to Saudi Arabia and later
Vice-President, has argued that India should not seek an observer status in the OIC; see
(Ansari 2006 ).
P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR

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