ble of his own—inviting Begin and Sadat to Camp David to hammer out an agree-
ment. Despite misgivings on both sides, the two leaders accepted and arrived at the
retreat on September 5.
Carter had planned for only a few days of meetings, but the sessions dragged on
for nearly two weeks and at several points appeared on the verge of collapse, as the
two leaders stuck by their long-held positions. The status of Israeli settlements in the
eastern Sinai proved to be the major stumbling block. Sadat insisted on their removal
and the return of all of Sinai to Egyptian control, while Begin vowed to keep the set-
tlements as a “security” measure for Israel. Under pressure from Carter, and after
receiving conflicting advice from his own delegation, Begin eventually agreed to relin-
quish the settlements, a decision that made a deal possible.
Begin, Carter, and Sadat then traveled to the White House, where late on the
evening of September 17 they signed two documents drafted by U.S. officials. One
document, Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel,
called for Israel to withdraw completely from the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for peace
and normal diplomatic relations with Egypt. It required that the two sides negotiate
a formal peace treaty within the next three months and implement all its measures
within two or three years. The second document, The Framework for Peace in the
Middle East, was more complex but also more ambiguous. It specified compliance with
UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for underlying peace in
the region and set out procedures for negotiations to resolve the “the Palestinian prob-
lem in all its aspects.” This framework called for a “transitional” period of up to five
years, during which Israel and its neighbors would negotiate the creation of a “self-
governing authority” for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Although
it promised an unspecified form of “autonomy” for the Palestinians, the framework
did not specifically call for Israel to withdraw from the territories, and it was vague or
silent on the toughest issues, notably the status of Jerusalem.
Carter and other U.S. officials exchanged letters with the two sides offering vari-
ous assurances or staking out positions on matters (such as Jerusalem) that had not
been settled in the two framework documents. In a letter to Begin, Defense Secretary
Harold Brown held out the promise of U.S. aid for two new Israeli airbases to replace
ones that would be abandoned in the Sinai.
The historic signing of the framework agreements generated decidedly mixed
reactions worldwide. In the United States and Europe, Carter and the two Middle
Eastern leaders were hailed as visionary statesmen. Key constituencies in Egypt and
Israel supported the accords as necessary, if distasteful, compromises for peace. Most
of the rest of the Arab world branded Sadat a traitor, especially Palestinians, who
believed that he had sold out their interests simply to regain the Sinai and who felt
that Sadat had no right to negotiate on their behalf. Begin and Sadat received the
1978 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts. (Carter did not share in that prize but was
awarded the peace prize in 2002 for his many achievements, including the Camp
David agreements.)
The negotiations toward a formal peace treaty, during the winter of 1978–1979,
were as difficult as the haggling at Camp David. In fact, some aspects of these negoti-
ations proved to be even more contentious as Begin and Sadat both came under increas-
ing pressure from the extreme elements of their respective constituencies to reverse the
compromises they had already accepted. In January 1979, Islamists in Iran ousted Shah
120 ARABS AND ISRAELIS