DOCUMENT
Hussein Speech to the National
Assembly before War with Iran
SEPTEMBER17, 1980.. .We considered it a good opportunity to save the security and national unity of Iraq
as well as the security of the valiant Iraqi Army. Thus, the party and government lead-
ership made a decision to negotiate with Iran on the basis that the Thalweg line would
be the border line in Shatt al-Arab. In exchange, Iran would return the Iraqi territo-
ries it retained under previous administrations contrary to the 1913 Constantinople
protocol, including the areas of Zayn al-Qaws and Sayf Sa’d liberated by our forces a
few days ago, and would also refrain from giving military aid and any other kind of
aid to the mercenary renegade gang in the northern part of the homeland.
Negotiations were held with Iran on this basis and the 6 March 1975 agreement
was signed. It was a big event at the time. As soon as the agreement was proclaimed,
the forces of the mercenary mutiny collapsed and the mutineers surrendered. The
weapons seized by the Iraqi Army amounted to 50,000 pieces, not counting the many
other Iranian weapons which were withdrawn during the 2-week respite given them.
Even after the end of the 2 weeks, the Iranians had to leave behind large quantities
of arms and equipment, which were seized by our brave army.
Brothers, the March 1975 agreement was a courageous and serious decision. It
was a national and pan-Arab decision. Courage is not only expressed by the skillful
use of the rifle and sword on the frontline with the enemy and in attack or defense,
but also by the ability of the leadership to make a courageous decision in defense of
the people and the nation to safeguard sovereignty when the rifle and sword alone can-
not achieve the objective.
The decision, made under those circumstances, saved Iraq from real dangers, which
were threatening its unity, security and future. That decision enabled our people to
continue with their revolution and the process of reconstruction and development and
so attain a high level of strength, progress and prosperity, preserving the dignity and
sovereignty of the Iraqis and enabling strong Iraq to serve the Arab nation and its great
mission.
The decision was not a surrender to a bitter reality—although the reality was
bitter and grave—but was an understanding of the reality through sensible and bal-
anced thinking, which took all circumstances and capabilities into consideration. The
March agreement was the result of circumstances. Our people understood it and
considered it, under the circumstances, a great victory. They welcomed it with great
rejoicing.
Although our army was courageously fighting the renegades and was not aware of
the facts we mentioned earlier—that is, the shortage in vital ammunition—and was
dealing punishing blows to the traitor renegades, it, too, welcomed the agreement with
great joy because it understood the significance of that agreement to the homeland’s
unity and future. It appreciated the objective reasons for concluding the agreement.
426 IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS