territories and other Arab lands, arguing that the United Nations should impose the
same sanctions against Israel that were being planned against Iraq.
International reaction to the Iraqi occupation was swift. Hours after the invasion
had begun, the UN Security Council on August 2 adopted Resolution 660 con-
demning the invasion and threatening punitive action against Iraq. The United States,
France, and Great Britain moved to freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti financial assets, and the
Soviet Union canceled planned weapons deliveries to Iraq. The Security Council on
August 6 followed its earlier resolution with another, Resolution 661, imposing
mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq, including a ban on international purchases
of Iraqi oil. (These sanctions would remain in effect, with some changes, until after
Hussein’s ouster in 2003.) The Security Council put teeth into its sanctions on August
25 when it adopted Resolution 665, authorizing countries (such as the United States)
with naval ships in the Persian Gulf to enforce the ban on Iraq’s trade. The U.S. Navy
had been doing this unilaterally since August 16.
UN sanctions and international denunciations of immediate symbolic effect began
within a few weeks to affect the Iraqi economy. The most important response at this
point, however, was an intense diplomatic effort by the United States to assemble a
coalition of countries willing to contribute troops to an international effort to force Iraq
from Kuwait, if necessary. Secretary of State James A. Baker III flew to capitals around
the world, and President George H. W. Bush telephoned dozens of fellow leaders in
one of the most successful U.S. diplomatic campaigns of the late twentieth century.
A unified position by the United States and the Soviet Union—countries in the
past fiercely at odds on many Middle Eastern issues—emerged as a result of this diplo-
macy and the simultaneous improvement in relations between the two superpowers in
the final years before the Soviet Union collapsed. In a joint statement issued during a
meeting in Helsinki on September 9, Bush and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev
pledged to take whatever actions were necessary to demonstrate “beyond any doubt
that aggression cannot and will not pay.” (This would be one of the last major inter-
national initiatives by Gorbachev, whose country would disintegrate a year later.)
All the diplomatic work paid off. On November 29, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 678, authorizing the U.S.-led coalition to use “all necessary means” to force
Iraq out of Kuwait if it had not left voluntarily by January 15, 1991. This was the
first UN authorization of war against a member nation since 1950, when the Security
Council authorized the United States and other countries to defend South Korea
against an invasion by North Korea. By the time the council adopted Resolution 678,
the United States had positioned more than 200,000 troops in Saudi Arabia and other
Persian Gulf countries, joining tens of thousands of troops from Britain, several other
European countries, and a handful of Arab states. The Pentagon called this massive
military presence Operation Desert Shield, signifying Washington’s determination to
protect Saudi Arabia from Iraq.
Another significant element of the international response to Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait involved financial support for the planned operations. At U.S. urging, Ger-
many, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries pledged billions of dollars to Middle
Eastern countries, such as Egypt, that provided troops to the U.S.-led coalition. They
also agreed to subsidize the U.S. military build-up in the Persian Gulf. (By the time
the war had ended, in February 1991, U.S. allies had pledged $54 billion, all of which
they eventually contributed.)
444 IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS