adding more American troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of the security
problem that are fed by the view that the U.S. presence is intended to be a long-
term “occupation.” We could, however, support a short-term redeployment or
surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and
equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would
be effective.
We also rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops, because we believe that
so much is at stake.
We believe that our recommended actions will give the Iraqi Army the support it
needs to have a reasonable chance to take responsibility for Iraq’s security. Given the
ongoing deterioration in the security situation, it is urgent to move as quickly as pos-
sible to have that security role taken over by Iraqi security forces.
The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large
numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq for three compelling reasons.
First, and most importantly, the United States faces other security dangers
in the world, and a continuing Iraqi commitment of American ground forces at
present levels will leave no reserve available to meet other contingencies. On Sep-
tember 7, 2006, General James Jones, our NATO commander, called for more
troops in Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO forces are fighting a resurgence of
al Qaeda and Taliban forces. The United States should respond positively to that
request, and be prepared for other security contingencies, including those in Iran
and North Korea.
Second, the long-term commitment of American ground forces to Iraq at current
levels is adversely affecting Army readiness, with less than a third of the Army units
currently at high readiness levels. The Army is unlikely to be able to meet the next
rotation of troops in Iraq without undesirable changes in its deployment practices. The
Army is now considering breaking its compact with the National Guard and Reserves
that limits the number of years that these citizen-soldiers can be deployed. Behind this
short-term strain is the longer-term risk that the ground forces will be impaired in
ways that will take years to reverse.
And finally, an open-ended commitment of American forces would not provide
the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take the political actions that give Iraq
the best chance of quelling sectarian violence. In the absence of such an incentive, the
Iraqi government might continue to delay taking those difficult actions.
While it is clear that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is moderating the vio-
lence, there is little evidence that the long-term deployment of U.S. troops by itself
has led or will lead to fundamental improvements in the security situation. It is impor-
tant to recognize that there are no risk-free alternatives available to the United States
at this time. Reducing our combat troop commitments in Iraq, whenever that occurs,
undeniably creates risks, but leaving those forces tied down in Iraq indefinitely creates
its own set of security risks.
RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not make an open-ended com-
mitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi gov-
ernment that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeploy-
550 IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS