ments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America’s other security
needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or inac-
tions of the Iraqi government.
RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the training and equipping
mission by the first quarter of 2008, as stated by General George Casey on October
24, 2006.
RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must change, with the high-
est priority given to the training, equipping, advising, and support mission and to
counterterrorism operations.
RECOMMENDATION 44: The most highly qualified U.S. officers and military per-
sonnel should be assigned to the imbedded teams, and American teams should be pres-
ent with Iraqi units down to the company level. The U.S. military should establish
suitable career-enhancing incentives for these officers and personnel.
RECOMMENDATION 45: The United States should support more and better
equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the Iraqi government to accelerate its
Foreign Military Sales requests and, as American combat brigades move out of Iraq,
by leaving behind some American equipment for Iraqi forces.
Restoring the U.S. MilitaryWe recognize that there are other results of the war in Iraq that have great conse-
quence for our nation. One consequence has been the stress and uncertainty imposed
on our military—the most professional and proficient military in history. The United
States will need its military to protect U.S. security regardless of what happens in Iraq.
We therefore considered how to limit the adverse consequences of the strain imposed
on our military by the Iraq war.
U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, have been stretched nearly to
the breaking point by the repeated deployments in Iraq, with attendant casualties
(almost 3,000 dead and more than 21,000 wounded), greater difficulty in recruiting,
and accelerated wear on equipment.
Additionally, the defense budget as a whole is in danger of disarray, as supple-
mental funding winds down and reset costs become clear. It will be a major chal-
lenge to meet ongoing requirements for other current and future security threats that
need to be accommodated together with spending for operations and maintenance,
reset, personnel, and benefits for active duty and retired personnel. Restoring the
capability of our military forces should be a high priority for the United States at
this time.
The U.S. military has a long tradition of strong partnership between the civilian
leadership of the Department of Defense and the uniformed services. Both have long
benefited from a relationship in which the civilian leadership exercises control with the
advantage of fully candid professional advice, and the military serves loyally with the
understanding that its advice has been heard and valued. That tradition has frayed,
and civil-military relations need to be repaired.
IRAQ AND THE GULF WARS 551