filtration and terroristattacks on Israelis. The capture and hanging
of Eli Cohenin Damascus in 1965 only fueled the flames. Arab at-
tacks caused Israeli retaliation. Tensions rose especially high in the
spring of 1967, when Syrian artillery shelled the Israeli settlement of
Tel-Katzir, below the Golan Heights. On 7 April the Israel Air Force
(IAF) sent planes to destroy the Syrian guns; Syrian aircraft took off
to defend them, and in the ensuing dogfight over the Golan Heights,
the IAF shot down six Syrian planes with no Israeli losses. The chief
of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin, warned that
Israel would not remain passive in the face of provocation. The Syr-
ians, concerned by their show of weakness, were nervous about Is-
rael’s conclusions and intentions. They turned to Egypt for support.
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, as the undisputed leader
of the Arab world, took up the challenge. On 14 and 15 May 1967,
lead units of two Egyptian divisions rolled into the Sinai Peninsula.
Nasser placed the Egyptian Army on full alert. The move took the Is-
raeli Intelligence community by surprise. Military Intelligence(MI)
had calculated that the Arab armies would not be ready for war until
1969–1970. The Egyptians had large numbers of troops tied down in
Yemen backing the anti-Saudi, antiroyalist forces there. In addition,
since the conclusion of the 1956 Sinai Campaign, the Sinai had been
effectively demilitarized. UN peacekeeping forces had been stationed
there as an Israeli condition for the withdrawal of its forces from the
Sinai following that war.
Once before, on 18 February 1960, following skirmishes on the
Israeli-Syrian border, Egypt had likewise sent large forces into the
Sinai with the intention of deterring Israel from attacking Syria. But
the Egyptian troop deployments in May 1967 were different. In 1960,
the Egyptians had entered the Sinai secretly so that their eventual
withdrawal could be low-key and honorable. However, in the May
1967 incursion, there was no radio silence or secrecy; in fact, the sight
of Egyptian tanks in bright sand camouflage en route to push the Is-
raelis into the sea received mass attention from the Arab media.
MI had only a few hours’ advance warning of the Egyptian move
into the Sinai. Even so, it was not overly worried. MI analysts be-
lieved that Nasser would order his army and tanks to withdraw after
a show of force and had put Israel in its place, as had happened in
February 1960. This was the feeling despite the fact that the Soviet
Union was clearly stirring up trouble in the region. The Soviets mightSIX-DAY WAR • 26506-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 265