have wished to instigate a conflict in order to humiliate Israel or to
instill a sense of invincibility in the Arab camp. In fact, on 13 May
the Kremlin had given spurious information about nonexistent Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) troop movements and about American inten-
tions to Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s deputy, who was on a visit to
Moscow. The Russians said that Israeli troops were massing and in-
tended to invade Syria. The Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, men-
tioned 11–13 Israeli brigades massing on the border with Syria. Sa-
dat immediately informed Nasser. The Soviets probably did not
intend a war to break out. They thought that both Israel and the Arabs
would stop short at the brink, but they were wrong. They seem to
have completely underestimated Israel’s ability and readiness to de-
fend itself.
On 15 May 1967 Israel celebrated its 19th Independence Day an-
niversary and the cabinet, based on the MI’s assessment, was confi-
dent that Nasser’s move would not escalate to a war in the region.
The mood changed the next day, when Nasser asked UN secretary-
general U Thant to withdraw UN forces from the Sinai. U Thant
quickly complied, leaving no international forces between Egypt’s
army in the Sinai and Israel’s borders. In fact, the speed with which
U Thant complied with Nasser’s request may have surprised even
Nasser. He may have been bluffing, but having gone this far when his
bluff was called, he could lose face by backing down.
By 19 May the Egyptian army had deployed six divisions in the
Sinai Peninsula. The director of the Mossad, Meir Amit, proposed that
Israel publish aerial reconnaissance photographs of the massive Egypt-
ian deployment. This tactic, according to Amit, would justify Israel’s
mobilization of its army reserves, which had begun in the early hours
of 16 May. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol rejected this idea.
On 20 May, MI received the ominous information that Nasser had
recalled three Egyptian brigades from Yemen. The same day, Egypt-
ian forces entered Sharm al-Sheikh at the southern tip of the Sinai. At
midnight of 22/23 May, Nasser announced the closure of the Strait of
Tiran, at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, thus closing off Israel’s
only shipping route through the Red Sea. The closure of these straits
was considered by Israel as a casus belli. This had been Israel’s red
line since the Sinai Campaignof 1956. Since then Israel had de-
clared several times that it would not tolerate any blockade of the
shipping routes through the Red Sea.266 • SIX-DAY WAR06-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 266