the Suez Canal, although in practice the army group intelligence of-
ficer was required to provide this kind of information. But after Feb-
ruary 1969 Egyptian defections ceased. Thereafter MI, together with
the field intelligence officers, engaged in specifying targets in Egypt
for the Israel Air Force (IAF) in Egypt’s hinterland. The most impor-
tant targets were Egyptian antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air mis-
sile (SAM) batteries. The difficulty was that the Egyptians frequently
moved their artillery. It was essential that the IAF find its targets from
the most updated information.
In addition, MI was tasked to provide accurate information for IDF
deep-penetration ground raids into Egyptian territory. In an attempt to
minimize the risk to life on intelligence-collecting missions, someone
came up with the idea of using a robot mounted on a simple model air-
plane that could be flown remotely by radio control, at a cost of about
$120 per flight. This robot, which collected pretty good pictures at
high resolution, may be considered the birth of the unmanned mini-
aircraft. It was used in various sectors along the Suez Canal.
Paradoxically, the success in targeting Egypt led to the involve-
ment of the Soviet Union in the battles of the War of Attrition, which
complicated matters. At times IAF pilots had to engage Soviet pilots
flying Egyptian Air Force aircraft. To prevent escalation to an inter-
national conflict, which could draw the superpowers into a military
clash, the United States initiated various cease-fire plans. The best-
known and most important was the Rogers Initiative (named for
William P. Rogers, U.S. secretary of state at that time). On 21 July
1970 the Israeli government decided to accept this initiative. Nasser
did likewise on 23 July, and the cease-fire went into effect on the
night of 7/8 August 1970. But no sooner had the shooting ceased than
Nasser moved SAM batteries into the Suez Canal zone in defiance of
the cease-fire agreement—and as accurately predicted by analysts of
MI under its director Major General Aharon Yariv.
As early as the morning of 8 August, IAF reconnaissance flights
showed clearly the presence of SAM batteries along the Suez Canal
that had not been there previously. Before the cease-fire, there had
been 16 missile battery sites, and only one of them within 19 miles (30
kilometers) of the Suez Canal. By IAF reconnaissance in October
1970 showed 50 SAM batteries, four of them in an 8- to 13-mile-wide
(13–21 kilometer) strip west of the Suez Canal. Forty-two of the bat-304 • WAR OF ATTRITION06-102 (04) Q-Z.qxd 3/24/06 7:26 AM Page 304