Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence

effectiveness of the Soviet-made Sagger antitank missiles, which the

Egyptian infantry used to devastating effect against Israeli armor, and

the SAMs the Egyptians and the Syrians used against the IAF.

King Hussein, despite concern for Arab solidarity, kept his own front

with Israel completely quiet during the war. Israel was thus able to

leave a skeleton force of a mere 28 tanks on the Jordan River bound-

ary, enabling its army and air force to concentrate on the immediate

Syrian and Egyptian threats. In those theaters, MI had impressive suc-

cesses. Field intelligence officers picked up on certain changes that oc-

curred on the battlefield during the war. One of the successes was the

prediction two days in advance of the start of the second stage of the

Egyptian offensive. This information was provided by MI to the chief

of the General Staff, Lieutenant General David Elazar, on 12 October.

On 16–17 October MI’s SIGINT department succeeded in tracking the

Egyptian 25th Armored Brigade as it made its way northward from the

Third Army enclave toward the Israeli crossing zone. This early warn-

ing information contributed to the decision of Major General Ariel

Sharon to set a two-brigade trap along the shore of the Great Bitter

Lake. The result was that the 25th Brigade was almost completely de-

stroyed with few Israeli casualties.

The most important information obtained by the field intelligence

officers was the “seam” between the Egyptian Second Army, which

had crossed the Suez Canal around Ismailia, and the Third Army to

the south, which had crossed between the Suez and the Bitter Lake.

The seam was the most vulnerable point of the Egyptian forces, and

through this seam the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reached the Suez

Canal at Dier Suweir on 15 October and crossed over to the west

bank of the canal. This was the beginning of the collapse of the

Egyptian forces. MI, by means of SIGINT, also collected information

on the location of the 47th Syrian Armored Brigade.

Still, it was mainly the courage, ingenuity, and leadership of the

armed forces on Israel’s southern and northern fronts that enabled Israel

to turn the tide of battle. This occurred within two days on the Golan

front. In the Sinai it took more than a week, but by mid-October it was

the IDF that was on the offensive, pummeling Egyptian armor; Israeli

troops had crossed to the west bank of the Suez Canal to destroy Egypt’s

defenses from the rear. By late October both Cairo and Damascus were

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