Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence

At about 2:00 A.M. on 5 October, Zamir got a phone call from the

Mossad’s case officer in London, who was in contact with Marwan

Ashraf. The latter had given him the code word “tsnon,” signifying

an immediate unleashing of war, but insisted on providing more de-

tails only to the Mossad’s director in person. Early in the morning of

5 October Zamir flew to London for the meeting.

At 3:45 A.M. on 6 October Zamir called Zeira from the Israeli em-

bassy in London on an open phone line due to the absence of a ci-

pher clerk; no clerks were available because of the Yom Kippur

break. Zamir conveyed Zeira Ashraf’s message that war would start

that day before sunset and that the attack would be combined and si-

multaneous, by Egyptian and Syrian forces at once. It is possible, as

Zeira subsequently and repeatedly insisted, that Ashraf deliberately

gave a different timing for the war’s start because he was a double

agent. It makes more sense to believe that Ashraf did know the ex-

act timing of the war as he had left Egypt for Europe, and then Lon-

don, on 2 October, a day before the two presidents, Sadat and Assad,

decided on the hour to start the war.

Events of the Yom Kippur War.The attack did not begin at 6:00 P.M.

as predicted by Marwan Ashwraf the day before the war, however; it

began at 1:55 P.M., and Israel was woefully unprepared. On the Golan

Heights 1,400 Syrian tanks and more than 1,000 artillery pieces faced

177 Israeli tanks and 50 artillery pieces—and even those few were

there only due to the last-minute partial call-up of reserves. In the

south, the Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal, easily overcoming Is-

raeli defenses, and as planned established a bridgehead about 6 miles

(10 kilometers) into the Sinai Peninsula.

Israel fought a tenacious battle on the Golan and turned the near-

defeat of 6 October into the recapture of almost all of the Golan by

the evening of the next day. Nevertheless, Syria’s rapid advance to-

ward the Sea of Galilee and Israel’s northern settlements unleashed

fear that will be hard for Israel ever to forget.

On the Sinai front, Egypt almost had the Mitla and Gidi passes open

before them before sufficient Israeli reserves arrived to defend Israel’s

southern borders. An additional failure of MI before the war, besides

not providing early warning, was its grave underestimation of the lethal

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