In 1969 Marwan Ashraf walked into the Israeli Embassy in London
and volunteered to furnish information. The offer was turned down.
Some time later he again offered his services, and it was decided to re-
cruit him after a thorough inquiry was conducted in order to determine
whether he had been sent by enemy intelligence to serve as a double
agent and to transmit false information. It is known that a “walk-in”
agent who volunteers his services inevitably arouses great suspicion as
to his motives, especially if he is well connected to his country’s regime
and appears to have access to secret information. In Ashraf’s case, it
emerged that his motives were not purely financial, but also stemmed
from a combination of ideological-political and family reasons.
Thus, Ashraf became aMossadagent—in fact, its so-called Top
Source and most important asset in Egypt—serving from 1969 until
the eve of the Yom Kippur Warin 1973. The Israeli intelligence
community assigned him the codenames Rashash and Chotel. In
newspaper articles published in Israel, reporters used the name Bavel,
without mentioning his real name due to strict censorship forbidding
its publication. The Mossad case officer assigned to handle Ashraf
was known only by his first name initial “D.” The two developed an
especially close relationship. At one point, when D was about to be
promoted and replaced, Marwan demanded that D continue to serve
as his liaison, thereby obstructing D’s chance for a promotion.
In May 1973 Ashraf provided information that, in the guise of a
military exercise, Egypt was planning to go to war. On the orders of
the then chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General David Elazar,
the Israel Defense Force called up reservists, which placed a heavy
and unexpected burden on the state budget. The Egyptians did not in
fact go to war, leading to a false sense of confidence in the Israeli mil-
itary and to the intelligence failure half a year later. Prior to the Yom
Kippur War, in October 1973 Ashraf again provided the Mossad with
early warning of an Egyptian offensive planned against Israel—a fac-
tual warning that went unheeded.
In September 2002, the book Israel’s War: A History since 1947,
written by Dr. Ahron Bregman, was published in Great Britain. In
the chapter on the Yom Kippur War, Bregman hinted at the identity
of the Top Source as being Nasser’s son-in-law. Following that rev-
elation, discovering his name became very easy, and the Egyptian
media uncovered it in July 2003. Bregman was interviewed by theASHRAF, MARWAN•1506-102 (02) A-G.qxd 3/24/06 7:23 AM Page 15