Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence

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The KGB managed the trials of the main Novocherkassk “conspira-
tors,” which sentenced 10 dangerous state criminals to death and oth-
ers to 10–15 years imprisonment. The riots at Novocherkassk were
symptomatic of public anger with the failure of Nikita Khru-
shchev’s political and economic reforms in the early 1960s, and in
several other cities the KGB and the army employed a very heavy
hand to maintain order.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. A major responsibility for both the
SVR(the Foreign Intelligence Service) and the FSB(the Federal Se-
curity Service) is nuclear proliferation. The SVR has publicly de-
clared that proliferation is a major target of its foreign intelligence
operations. The FSB has been given a far harder task—the protection
of Russia’s nuclear installations from terrorists, smugglers, and en-
emy agents. The FSB works in concert with the Federal Agency for
Atomic Energy and the Ministry of Defense to protect military bases,
storage facilities, and power plants. The FSB has apparently had
some successes: in 2002 the FSB announced that it had detained two
Chechen terrorists in the act of reconnoitering a nuclear facility. Nev-
ertheless, provincial FSB officers have publicly reported that
weapons-grade material has disappeared. The Central Intelligence
Agency’s National Intelligence Council noted in its pessimistic 2004
report to the U.S. Congress: “We assess that undetected smuggling
has occurred, and we are concerned about the total amount of mate-
rial that could have been diverted in the past 13 years.”


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OCTOBER 1964 COUP.The KGBplayed a critical role in removing
Nikita Khrushchevfrom power in October 1964. Many KGB pro-
fessionals were concerned with Khrushchev’s style of leadership, and
senior KGB officers readily agreed with party conservatives led by
Leonid Brezhnevand Mikhail Suslov that he had to be removed for
the good of the Communist Partyand the Soviet state. The plot took
shape over several months as the conspirators built support.
Khrushchev’s son sought to warn his father, but Khrushchev believed
that his colleagues were too incompetent and cowardly to act.

178 •NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

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