countries. These relationships serve several purposes, the most im-
portant of which is to share intelligence information and thereby sup-
plement each other’s collection capabilities. Occasionally, they liaise
to cement ties between their countries. Frequently, they establish in-
telligence liaisons in order to discern each other’s activities.
The intensity of a liaison relationship for U.S. intelligence agen-
cies depends in large measure on whether or not the United States
maintains a formal defense arrangement with the country in question.
Where there is no formal defense relationship, intelligence liaison is
issue specific and sporadic. Where a formal defense relationship ex-
ists, such as an alliance treaty or a friendship pact, the intelligence li-
aison relationship tends to be close. However, even in this context,
there are gradations of closeness, and intelligence relationships often
depend on additional factors, such as the degree of “friendship,” like
the “special relationship” between the United States and the United
Kingdom.INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT.Intelligence oversight refers to the
authorities ascribed to external entities to review and authorize intel-
ligence programs, appropriate funds for them, and investigate, eval-
uate, and audit intelligence activities. Intelligence oversight also
refers to the accountability of intelligence agencies for their actions.
While the concept refers both to executive and legislative oversight,
it is generally associated with the activities of congressional over-
sight committees.
The history of modern American intelligence is replete with exec-
utive oversight but little by way of legislative oversight. From the en-
actment of the National Security Act of 1947onward, various exec-
utive bodies have exercised considerable oversight. The National
Security Council (NSC), its covert actionreview committees, and
other entities like the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and
its successor, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(PFIAB), have maintained significant executive control over intelli-
gence agencies.
Until the late 1970s, however, legislative oversight was confined
to occasional meetings between the director of central intelligence
(DCI) and chairmen of the congressional authorizing committees,
such as the Armed Services Committees, which had jurisdiction over98 • INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT05-398 (2) Dictionary.qxd 10/20/05 6:27 AM Page 98