NOTES TO CHAPTER 13 1107described as having been made after the Imjin invasions (1592). It appears to be an
extended version of a proposal Yu first made in 159 [. just prior to the invasion. The pro-
posal was not adopted at the time. This second version was made in 1594 when Yu was
chief state councilor, Sonja sitlok, 49:24a-b (1594). cited in Yukkun sagwan hakkyo.
Han'guk kunsa yon'gusil [R.O.K. Army Military Academy, Research Hall for Korean
Military History], Hall 'guk kUlljesa: Kume Choscln chon 'gip 'y(}n [The military history
of Korea: Recent times, the early Choson period] (Seoul: Yukkun ponbu, 1968), p. 298
n.194, for an abhreviated version. This source is hereafter refelTed to as Han'guk kun-
jesa (1968). For the original proposal, see Sonja sujong sillok 25:19a-h (l59!), cited in
Han 'gtlk kwzjesa (1968), p, 297 n. 193.
- PGSR 21:20b.
26. Hall 'guk kunjesa (1968), pp. 380-8 J. Hideyoshi issued orders dividing up his inva-
sionunits on 3.18 (May 29,1592). Corps J -9 had !58,700 men (avg. of 17,633 per corps),
with J 18,300 men in camp in Japan. The Eighth Corps of 10,000 men was stationed in
Tsushima, the Ninth Corps of 1 1,500 in lUi Island, so that the actual number of troops
emharking on the invasion was 137,200 men. The front line was to consist of the First
Corps of 18,700 men and the Second Corps of 22,800 men and the Third Corps of I 1,000
men, a total of 52,YJO men. By the end of the year, the Japanese had 18,000 men in
P'yong'an, 22,000 in Hamgyong, 11,000 in Hwanghae, 25,000 in Kaesong, 20,000 in
Hansong, 13,000 in Kangwon, J 5,000 in Ch'ungch'ong, and 40,000 in Kyongsang, a total
of 166,000 men. Yi Hyongsok, Jmjin chOllansa [History of the Imjin War] 1 (Seoul: Sin-
hyonsilsa, 1974), pp. 135, 151. - Han'guk kwzjesa (968), p. 291.
- The history and causes of the breakdown of the chin 'gwan system are discussed
in detail in ibid., pp. 275-9J. - PGSR 2 J :20b, 60a.
- Ihid. 2 J :2Ib-22a; see ibid. 21 :20b ff. for above material.
3 J. Ihid. 21: 22b. - Ihid. 2 I:23h-25b.
33. Ihid. 21 :26a-h. These liaison officials were not part of thc original saga system in
the 1590s. - Ihid. 2 I :26b-27a.
- Ihid. 2 I :57b.
- Ibid. 2 I: 58a.
- Ihid. 2I:17a.
- Ibid. 21:7 [b-72a. For the text ofYu Songnyong's discussion of the principle of
subdivision that was the essence of sog'o, see Sdae munjip, I4:5b-6h. Taedong munhwa
yon'guw6n, ed. (1959), p. 240. - PGSR 2 J :69b.
- Ihid. 21:7Ia.
4 I. Tbid. 2 [:40a-b on testing, ibid. 44b et passim on training, ibid. 2 J :6a ft'. on failure
to select officers on the basis of skill or training. - Tbid. 2 I :70b.
- Tbid. 2 r =45a-b.