124 { China’s Quest
back from support for Egypt. Following the canal’s nationalization but before
the Anglo-French-Israeli attack, the Western countries proposed an inter-
national conference to deliberate on the legality of Egypt’s nationalization.
The Soviet Union reached an “understanding” with London to participate
in such a conference. Mao saw this as unprincipled compromise with im-
perialism. Rather than supporting Egypt’s militant struggle against imperi-
alism, Moscow was seeking a peaceful settlement. Equally egregious, China
was not invited to participate in the projected conference, and Moscow did
not demand China’s participation. This too represented Soviet capitulation to
Western imperialism’s containment of China. Again under strong Chinese
and Egyptian pressure, Moscow backed away from the idea of convening an
international conference.
Khrushchev did eventually threaten “to use force ... to crush the aggres-
sors and restore peace in the Middle East” if Anglo-French forces did not
halt. During the crisis, Beijing was careful to maintain public unanimity with
Moscow, and lauded Moscow’s statement as a “practical threat” to Britain and
France. But years later, in a long 1973 interview with an Egyptian reporter,
Zhou Enlai gave the Chinese view of the Soviet warning. It was, Zhou said, an
“empty shot” that was issued only once Moscow understood that Washington
would intervene to force Britain and France to withdraw from Egypt. There
was no risk for Moscow in making that warning, Zhou said.
In sum, Moscow had been initially unwilling to arm Egypt in the face of
Western threats. Moscow had been willing to go along with imperialist diplo-
matic schemes to undermine Egypt. Moscow had issued “practical support”
for Egypt only after US policy made clear there was no risk in giving such
“support.” The CCP maintained a facade of socialist unity during the crisis,
but it emerged from it with deepened doubts about Khrushchev’s lack of re-
solve in confronting imperialism. The crisis also confirmed for Mao the im-
perative need for China to develop as quickly as possible the practical ability
to influence more decisively events in such regions as the Middle East.Mao’s Challenge to the CPSU at the 1957 Moscow ConferenceBy mid-1957, PRC influence was at an apex, in the estimate of Wu Lengxi who
accompanied Mao to a global conference of communist parties in November
of that year to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik insurrection.
China’s successful participation in the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina,
its 1955 participation in the Bandung Conference, its role in Eastern Europe,
and its influence on Moscow’s handling of relations among fraternal parties
and in the debate over the “Stalin question” had enhanced Beijing’s influence,
in Wu’s view. In June 1957, Mao had also given important support—according
to Lu Lengxi’s account—to Khrushchev when the Soviet leader defeated an