180 { China’s Quest
of the Brahmaputra Valley. Panic spread across India. There were fears that
Chinese forces would seize India’s northeast, or perhaps march on Calcutta.
Then the Chinese forces stopped. Beijing unilaterally declared a ceasefire,
and Chinese forces began withdrawing over the recently won ground, back to
what China said was the line of actual control prior to the beginning of India’s
Forward Policy. Figure 7-1 illustrates the main line of Chinese attack in 1962.
China’s decision for war with India was a costly one, but it achieved the
objective of making Indian leaders more soberly respectful of China’s power.
India abandoned its forward policy, thus stabilizing Tibet’s southern fron-
tier. The confrontations and firefights that had plagued that border since 1961
ceased, as did Indian efforts to push Chinese forces back to the line claimed
by India. While Tibetan resistance fighters and probably Indian spies would
continue to infiltrate across that border for many years, China did not again
confront chronic fighting there. More broadly, New Delhi began paying far
greater attention to Chinese warnings. 1962 was the Indian equivalent of 1950BHUTAN
(Indian protectorate)
INDIA
Northeast Frontier
AgencyTIBETAN AUTONOMOUS REGION
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Boundary claimed by
India: “McMahon Line”Boundary claimed
by China; foothills
of eastern HimalaysChako
20 Nov. falls
to PLA; PLA
advance haltsTawang
24 Oct. falls to
PLA without
a battle20 Oct.; Massive
PLA assaultsBum La Pass
16,500’Se La Pass 14,600’;
highest pass in region;
18 Nov. falls to PLA
Bomdila Pass 10,400’;
19 Nov. falls to PLA
Pass
Road/trail
Chinese thrusts
Indian positionsF IGU R E 7-1 Main Line of Chinese Advance against India, 1962
Source: Allen S. Whiting, “The Sino-Soviet Split,” in Roderick MacFarquhar and John King Fairbank, eds.,
The Cambridge History of China, Volume 14, The People’s Republic, Part I: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949–1965,
(Cambridge University Press: New York, 1987), p. 522.