Quest to Transform Southeast Asia } 221
was discussed during two visits by Chen Yi to Indonesia in November and
December 1964.^66 The Joint Communiqué resulting from the second of those
visits provided that Indonesia and the PRC would reinforce and make more
effective their cooperation. Subandrio told Indonesian ambassadors that dur-
ing his talks the two sides had agreed on a division of revolutionary spheres of
influence in the area. China would guide developments in the peninsular ter-
ritory north of Singapore, while Indonesia would be responsible for Borneo
and Singapore. Scholar Victor Fic suggests that Subandrio may have been
exaggerating, yet conveying a sense of what the leaders of the two countries
had in mind.^67 During a January 1965 visit to Beijing, Subandrio discussed
with Zhou Enlai provision of arms for the “workers and peasants” force. Zhou
agreed that China would supply 100,000 “pieces.”^68 In May 1965, a high-level
PRC delegation headed by Peng Zhen visited Indonesia to celebrate the PKI’s
anniversary. During the visit Peng openly endorsed the PKI’s call for arm-
ing a “workers and peasants” force to safeguard Indonesia against imperial-
ist invasion.^69 It is likely that Peng, Sukarno, Subandrio, and Aidit discussed
modalities for delivery of arms.
By mid-1965 Sukarno understood that he could no longer balance be-
tween the PKI and the army, and that a showdown between those two was
inevitable. Sukarno believed that the Indonesian revolution must move into
the socialist stage, and was thus inclined toward cooperation with the PKI’s
plan. Sukarno was concerned, however, about his personal fate once the
PKI held power. Would not the PKI get rid of him once he had served their
purpose?^70 The issue was forced by Sukarno’s declining health. Suffering
from severe kidney disease, Sukarno had a severe attack in mid-July 1965
and then again on August 4. Sukarno’s health was attended to by a team
of Chinese doctors, and precise information about the attacks was passed
to both Beijing and the PKI. After the August 4 attack, Sukarno’s Chinese
doctors reported that their patient might soon die. Since utilization of
Sukarno’s authority to remove “reactionary” generals and appoint “progres-
sive” replacements was essential to the PKI’s plan, action was imperative.
Aidit was in Beijing at the time, and immediately discussed the issue with
Chinese leaders. On August 5, the day after Sukarno’s second and most se-
rious attack, Aidit met with Mao. After being briefed by Aidit on the situa-
tion, Mao replied:
Mao: You should act quickly.
Aidit: I am afraid the army is going to be the obstacle.
Mao: Well, do as I advise you and eliminate all the reactionary Generals
and officers in one blow. The Army will be a headless dragon and
follow you.
Aidit: That would mean killing some hundreds of officers.
Mao: In Northern Shensi I killed 20,000 cadres in one stroke.^71