220 { China’s Quest
The PKI was Beijing’s other policy instrument in Indonesia. In 1964–1965,
the PKI was the world’s largest nonruling communist party. Its position in
Indonesian society had grown in the early 1960s in partnership with Sukarno’s
effort to create a new domestic social order. Throughout the early 1960s, as
Islamic, business, and other civic organizations were steadily reduced in
power, the scope of PKI influence expanded. During 1963, the PKI under the
leadership of D. N. Aidit moved decisively toward the CCP’s strategy of vio-
lent revolution. In the countryside, the PKI took over village committees and
began to push for radical land reform. Sukarno allowed the PKI to intensify
efforts to infiltrate government offices. Sukarno increasingly allied with the
PKI, and used his powers as president to facilitate its expansion of influence.
By early 1965, the PKI was pushing for full-blown agrarian revolution followed
swiftly by the elimination of “corrupt capitalists.” The Indonesian army was
virtually the only organization remaining beyond PKI control. Indonesian
politics was increasingly polarized between the PKI and the army.
The PKI recognized the army as the greatest obstacle to PKI rule of
Indonesia. Sukarno was the PKI’s major protection against the army. But
what if Sukarno died or was overthrown by anticommunist generals? The PKI
realized it needed an armed force under its own command if it was to push
the revolution forward, perhaps even it was merely to survive. It tried sev-
eral approaches. One approach was to establish a political commissar system
within the army, with commissars supplied by the PKI. The army vetoed this
outright. Another approach was subverting the army. In furtherance of this,
the PKI established a Bureau of Special Affairs, highly secret and chaired by
Aidit, to infiltrate the army. “Progressive officers” were identified, mentored
by designated PKI tutors, and graded on their inclination toward cooperation
with the PKI and the revolutionary cause.
The PKI’s subversive efforts had some success; by mid-1965, some forty-four
high-ranking officers had been won over.^65 The PKI planned to use the author-
ity of President Sukarno to fire top conservative generals and simultaneously
appoint “progressive” PKI-tutored officers to key positions controlling the
armed forces. Air force head Omar Dani was deemed the most likely candi-
date to become the new head of the armed forces and presidential successor
to Sukarno; the air force was more “progressive” than the more “reactionary”
army. PKI chief Aidit was to be premier, controlling the state. PKI cadres
would then be assigned to units of the army and the revolutionization of the
army pushed forward. But a key weakness remained: the PKI had no armed
force under its full control. The PKI decided to address this problem by form-
ing a “workers and peasants” militia, ostensibly to defend against “imperial-
ist” attacks from Malaysia, but in fact to safeguard Indonesia’s revolutionary
forces and push forward into the socialist stage.
Beijing agreed with the PKI assessment that it needed a revolutionary
armed force under its command. China’s role in the formation of such a force