The Cultural Revolution } 279
The 1969 Sino-Soviet Confrontation
On March 2, 1969, a Soviet border patrol pursued a squad of Chinese sol-
diers across the ice covering the Ussuri River and onto Zhenbao Island
(Damansky Island to the Russians) about 240 kilometers (150 miles) south
of Khabarovsk.^28 The disputed islands lay on the Chinese side of the thalweg
(the central line of the main navigational channel), a principle commonly
recognized by international law as the basis for boundary delineation. China
insisted that the border followed the thalweg, placing Zhenbao and a number
of other islands in China. The Soviet Union insisted that the border followed
the river’s edge on the Chinese side, making all these islands Soviet terri-
tory. Figure 10-1 illustrates the situation of these islands. Since 1966, there had
been an escalating but previously nonlethal confrontation over Zhenbao and
other river islands. Soviet patrols had confronted Chinese patrols of these
islands and insisted they stop violating Soviet territory. Chinese patrols had
equally insisted that the islands were Chinese territory and that they would
continue to patrol them. Confrontations escalated from swearing and shov-
ing to beating with clubs or rifle butts, use of high-pressure water hoses and
axes to cut such hoses, and threatening pointing of weapons. Finally, on two
occasions in early 1969, the Soviet commander of a patrol gave warning that
further Chinese patrols onto Zhenbao would be fired on by Soviet forces.
Unknown to the Soviet patrol that followed the Chinese onto ice-bound
Zhenbao Island on March 2, Chinese forces had prepared well-situated and
camouflaged heavy weapons positions on the Chinese bank covering the
anticipated path of the Chinese patrol. When firing began—the two sides dis-
pute who fired first—the Soviet patrol was surprised to find itself enfiladed by
very effective Chinese fire.
The decision to take a stand at Zhenbao in a situation tactically advanta-
geous to China was certainly made by Mao. Mao’s decision was an attempt
to deter further and possibly expanded Soviet aggression against China by
confronting Moscow with China’s determination to stand firm and meet
Soviet aggression in a tit-for-tat fashion, even if that entailed bloody military
conflict with the USSR.^29 As with India in October 1962, striking first by sur-
prise and in tactically advantageous conditions was an application of Mao’s
doctrine of active defense. Rather than waiting for the enemy to complete his
offensive and aggressive preparations and allowing him to choose the time
and place to launch his aggression, China would strike first at a time and
place of its own choosing to disrupt the enemy’s preparations. This bloody
Chinese rebuff would cause China’s rival to stop and take stock of its ag-
gressive course. China’s firm stance would make clear to the aggressor that
continued aggression against China’s territory would be costly, ultimately too
costly to make sense.