Rapprochement with the United States } 301
came the day before the Shanghai communiqué was to be issued, when State
Department officials realized that the document contained affirmations of
the continuing effectiveness of US security treaties with Japan and South
Korea, but not of the treaty with Taiwan. Understanding that this would be
seen as “abandonment” of Taiwan in the United States, Kissinger asked that
the references to US security treaties be deleted. Qiao Guanhua adamantly
refused to revisit already negotiated and agreed-upon terms. Mao, however,
overruled Qiao and ordered acceptance of the US request.^26 Of course, Mao
was the only person on the Chinese side who could order greater flexibility.
He used that authority to guide the negotiations and his summit with Nixon
to a successful conclusion.
In May 1971, after ping-pong diplomacy and in preparation for Kissinger’s
upcoming first and secret visit, the Politburo set up a Central Foreign Affairs
Group consisting of Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, and Huang Hua, charged with
working out guidelines for the upcoming Sino-US talks.^27 The guidelines ul-
timately consisted of eight points:
- US military forces would be withdrawn from Taiwan and the
Taiwan Strait within a given period of time. If no agreement could
be reached on this point, it was possible that Nixon’s visit could be
deferred. - Taiwan was Chinese territory and its liberation was an internal
affair of China in which no foreign interference was allowed.
“Japanese militarism” should be strictly prevented from entering
Ta iwa n. - China will strive to liberate Taiwan in peaceful ways. It will work
carefully regarding the Taiwan issue. - Establishment of ambassadorial-level relations would require US
recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China. All
activities aimed at “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan,” should
be firmly opposed. - If the previous three [sic] conditions could not be fully met, it would
be permissible to establish liaison offices [in lieu of embassies]. - China would not initiate discussion of the question of UN
representation, but if the US side did, China would make clear the
unacceptable nature of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”
arrangements. - Talks about trade would be entered into only after the United States
accepted the principle of withdrawal of US military forces from
Ta iwa n. - The Chinese government stands for the withdrawal of US forces
from Indochina and all of Southeast Asia, Korea, and Japan “so that
peace in the Far East will be maintained.”