312 { China’s Quest
Beijing informed Islamabad that while Pakistan would have China’s strong
political and material support, China was not in a position to intervene mili-
tarily in hostilities in the subcontinent, even international hostilities.^49 China
did agree, however, to provide Pakistan with substantial additional military
equipment.
In November 1971, only weeks before India’s outright invasion of East
Pakistan, one of West Pakistan’s leading civilian, populist, and pro-Chinese
leaders, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, led a high-level delegation to Beijing to plead for
reversal of China’s April decision against intervention. Bhutto wanted China
to promise diversionary actions in the Himalayas to hold down Indian forces
in the event of war. Again China declined.^50 Beijing agreed only to fire a few
“empty cannons.” In November, acting foreign minister Ji Pengfei (Chen Yi
was dying of cancer) declared, “Our Pakistani friends may rest assured that
should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression, the Chinese government
and people will, as always, resolutely support the Pakistan government and
people in their just struggle to defend their state, sovereignty and national
independence.^51 Ji’s statement did not mention defense of Pakistan’s “terri-
torial integrity.” The themes of Ji’s statement were repeated by Chinese rep-
resentatives on several occasions as the crisis reached its climax. Pakistani
representatives greatly exaggerated prospects for Chinese intervention.
Beijing did not publicly contradict these exaggerations, probably because they
were part of Pakistan’s efforts to deter Indian invasion. That invasion came
on December 4, following a preemptive Pakistani air strike against Indian
air bases the previous day. Fighting lasted twelve days; Pakistani forces sur-
rendered on December 16.
The most effective Chinese instrument of influence over India at this
juncture was Beijing’s emerging anti-hegemony partnership with the United
States. Nixon and Kissinger saw parallel US and Chinese approaches toward
Indian and Soviet policies as an opportunity to put into action their vision of
Sino-American strategic cooperation. They also believed that if Soviet-backed
India were allowed to completely eviscerate Pakistan, prospects for establish
a balance constraining the Soviet Union would be greatly diminished.^52 In
a meeting in New York City on December 10, in the midst of fierce fighting
between Indian and Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, Kissinger met with
China’s newly appointed United Nations representative Huang Hua to work
out a common approach to the South Asian crisis. Nixon and Kissinger had
received an intelligence report indicating that Indian leader Indira Gandhi
intended to turn India’s military forces against West Pakistan once Pakistani
forces in the east surrendered. Unless this was prevented, India would achieve,
with Soviet backing, domination of South Asia.^53 Kissinger told Huang:
The Pakistani army in the East has been destroyed. The Pakistani army
in the West will run out of [gasoline] in another two or three weeks ...