398 { China’s Quest
and not Communist China. Then when Saigon fell in April 1975, PRC flags
and posters of Mao Zedong appeared in Cholon. VWP authorities ordered
them removed.^37 As Hanoi began initial moves toward transition to socialism
in South Vietnam in 1977, Cholon, with its abundantly stocked stores and vi-
brant markets, stood in stark contrast to the ill-stocked state-controlled stores
that constituted the growing state sector. Hanoi saw this as a “Chinese” ef-
fort to sabotage Vietnam’s economic development. Hanoi became convinced
that Vietnam now faced a multifaceted Chinese pressure campaign: from the
Khmer Rouge in the west, from China’s PLA in the north, and the Cholon
fifth column in the very heart of South Vietnam. Beijing aspired to dominate
Vietnam, CPV leaders convinced themselves. Under these circumstances,
what if Cholon’s capitalist fifth column created economic disruptions while
the Khmer Rouge, armed and financed by Beijing, attacked from the west?
In February, the same session of the CPV Politburo that decided to estab-
lish an anti–Pol Pot Khmer liberation organization also considered the secu-
rity implications of Cholon’s control over South Vietnam’s economy. The
Politburo met again in mid-March 1978 to finalize an assault on Cholon’s
Chinese capitalists.
Early one morning in late March, Vietnamese police and militia suddenly
surrounded Cholon neighborhoods. Squads of specially trained Vietnamese
student volunteers then entered and searched all homes and shops. Goods
were inventoried and declared state property which could not be sold. Gold
and cash were confiscated on the spot. Seven tons of gold was reportedly thus
nationalized.^38 The transition to socialism thus moved into high gear. Soon,
young men from Cholon began to be drafted into the military, perhaps to
serve in Cambodia. Many ethnically Chinese families were shipped off to
“New Economic Zones” in virgin or abandoned rural areas. Life in these
Zones was typically primitive and hard. Disposing of mines and unexploded
ordinance was a common and highly dangerous duty. Confronting such per-
secution, Chinese people and families began to flee as best they could. By
mid-1978, Public Security Bureaus in South Vietnamese coastal towns were
building boats, filling them with ethnic Chinese, and pushing them out to
sea—after demanding large payments of gold or dollars. The more fortunate
among these “boat people” encountered friendly ships that took them aboard
and conveyed them to refugee camps in nearby countries. Over two years, an
estimated quarter million ethnic Chinese fled South Vietnam. An estimated
30,000–40,000 died at sea.^39
It was pure serendipity that Hanoi’s vicious solution to its “Chinese
problem” coincided with a new Chinese appeal to Chinese communities
across Southeast Asia to contribute to China’s modernization drive. A January
1978 article by Liao Chengzhi in Renmin ribao exemplified the new appeal to
Overseas Chinese. Overseas Chinese were part of the Chinese nation, and
with a destiny closely linked to the motherland, Liao wrote. Overseas Chinese,