496 { China’s Quest
Again, US actions provided cover for Tokyo. In late May, President Bush had
extended MFN status for China and conveyed his “understanding” for Tokyo’s
revival of its third yen loan to China.^19 During the Houston G-7 summit, Kaifu
announced Japan’s decision to resume lending to China. Japan was thus the
first member of the G-7 to begin dismantling sanctions imposed after 6-4.
Kaifu also urged the other G-7 leaders at Houston to resume aid. Shortly after
Kaifu’s role at the Houston G-7 summit, a Japanese foreign ministry delega-
tion at the vice-ministerial level arrived in Beijing to inform China that Japan
was restarting its government lending to China. This was the highest-ranking
Western official to visit China since 6-4. PRC Vice President Wang Zhen
expressed gratitude for Kaifu’s actions and emphasized the importance of
Sino-Japanese friendship for world peace. In December 1990, Tokyo extended
to China a new loan of 43 billion yen (about US$320 million) for seventeen
major transportation and telecommunications projects.
In August 1991, Kaifu became the first top Western leader to visit Beijing
since the Beijing massacre. Kaifu’s visit symbolized the full normalization of
Sino-Japanese relations—six years before renormalization of Sino-US relations
would be achieved. During Kaifu’s visit, China announced its willingness to
enter the nuclear nonproliferation treaty—an act which atom-bomb-ravaged
Japan greatly appreciated. An April 1992 visit by Party chief Jiang Zemin to
Japan further prepared the way for an imperial visit. In October, that path-
breaking visit finally transpired.
Beijing’s post-6-4 friendship offensive toward Japan culminated in October
1992 with the first-ever visit by Japan’s emperor to China. World War II–era
Emperor Hirohito had died on January 7, 1989, and been succeeded by his
son Akihito. When Japan’s foreign minister visited Beijing in April 1991, Qian
praised Japan’s efforts on China’s behalf and proposed a visit to China by
Emperor Akihito. This was a bold proposal. This visit would, Qian recog-
nized, “break the western prohibition on high-level visits with China.” The
Japanese side was generally positive toward the notion of an imperial visit.^20
The future of China’s relations with the United States was still uncertain.
A rupture with the United States was still possible, and in that event, Japan
offered a viable alternative as a source of technology and capital. Thus during
the imperial visit, Chinese media stressed the positive climate for investment,
trade, and regional stability, along with the commonalities of the civiliza-
tions. Beijing censored popular demands for Japanese reparations to World
War II victims, and did not contest Akihito’s relatively vague mea culpa on
the history issue: “In the long history of relationship between our two coun-
tries, there was an unfortunate period in which my country inflicted great
sufferings on the people of China. I deeply deplore this.”
Shortly after Akihito’s visit, and after Beijing’s friendship campaign
toward Tokyo had served its purpose, China began to take a far more critical
approach to Japan’s aspirations to a regional leadership role. Tokyo’s push to