538 { China’s Quest
anti-Vietnamese Sihanouk-led coalition containing the Khmer Rouge. This
important shift in US policy suggested that the United States might align with
Hanoi and Hun Sen against the Khmer Rouge, a move which a number of
members of Congress were in fact advocating.^23
The prospect of a US switch of alignment to support for Hanoi and the
Vietnam-supported Cambodian communists pushed Beijing to shift course
and work out an accommodation with Vietnam. Beijing trumped the hinted
defection of the United States to Hanoi’s side by itself playing the Hanoi card.
The continuing evaporation of Soviet support further induced Hanoi to com-
promise. Thus, in September 1990, a high-powered Vietnamese delegation
headed by the Vietnam Communist Party secretary general and the premier
visited Beijing for “secret talks” (neibu huiwu) on Cambodia with Jiang Zemin,
Li Peng, and Qian Qichen. Agreement was reached on complete Vietnamese
withdrawal under UN supervision. Hanoi and Beijing also agreed to send
representatives to an upcoming meeting in Jakarta of the Cambodian fac-
tions, and to urge all parties to reach a settlement within the UN framework.
Washington feared at this juncture that Beijing would opt for a “Red solution”
between Beijing and Hanoi and drop the UN Framework Agreement. But
Beijing remained true to the Agreed Framework of a year earlier.^24 In effect,
Hanoi and Beijing both agreed to deliver their respective Cambodian clients
for a settlement. A visit to China in November 1991 by the general secretary of
the Vietnam Communist Party and the president of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam marked the normalization of Sino-Vietnam relations. Sino-Vietnam
rapprochement reduced the risk that Hanoi would drift from alignment with
the Soviet Union to alignment with the United States.^25
A second Paris conference on Cambodia was held in October 1991 to for-
malize establishment of a United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC). UNTAC was given full authority for supervising a ceasefire, repa-
triating refugees, disarming and demobilizing factional armies, and prepar-
ing the country for the conduct of internationally supervised free and fair
elections that would produce a new government leading, in turn, to a new
constitution for the nation. In March 1992, a 22,000-strong UN peacekeep-
ing force established itself in Cambodia and began work. This was the first
time the United Nations had effectively taken over administration of a whole
country. UNTAC was generally effective. Elections were held in May 1993,
with 90 percent of the eligible electorate voting. Sihanouk returned to preside
over a coalition government that eventually gave the country peace for the
first time in over twenty years.
Through its Cambodian diplomacy, Beijing freed Cambodia from
Vietnamese domination, restoring an independent and China-friendly
Cambodia such as had existed prior to 1970 or 1978. China had proved its
effectiveness as Cambodia’s protector against Vietnamese attempts to rule it.
By doing this, it had secured for China a reliable and pliant ally in the heart