China and America in the Persian Gulf } 567
deadline would be followed by “severe consequences,” according to the US
draft resolution, The debate over the US proposal became very heated. France,
Russia, and Germany were vehemently opposed. China, however, took a
low-key approach. During a crucial Security Council meeting, for example,
after the United States called for a strong resolution threatening “severe
consequences” for Iraqi noncompliance, France suggested a two-stage pro-
posal. A “final warning” if followed by Iraqi noncompliance would lead to
yet another Security Council meeting to decide on a response. The Russian
representative felt that no new Security Council resolution was necessary at
all. During Security Council debates, China’s representatives typically sec-
onded the opinions and proposals of antiwar countries France, Russia, and
Germany, but did so late in debate, and with brief statements stripped of the
acrimony that often characterized the comments of French, German, and
Russian representatives.
During the crucial debate on October 17, after another half dozen or so
countries had spoken, China’s representative weighed in. The “long absence
of a solution to the Iraq question did not serve peace and stability of the
region or the credibility of the [Security] Council,” the Chinese representa-
tive said. Iraq should “unconditionally and without restrictions,” and “at an
early date,” implement the resolutions of the Security Council.” Under these
circumstances, China “would consider” a new resolution of the question.^22
In the context of the ongoing debate, this was very close to an endorsement
of the US view. At one point during the Security Council debates, a French
representative asked China to take a stronger stance against the US drive
for war. Beijing declined. When Resolution 1441, warning Iraq that it “will
face serious consequences” if it did not promptly give UN inspectors full
and effective cooperation, came to a vote on November 8, 2002, China voted
“yes.” Following the US overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the collapse of
that regime, China worked actively, and again sometimes contrary to French
and Russian moves, to quickly give the US occupation the legitimacy of UN
authorization.
One way in which China’s stance on the 2003 war did not differ from its
position on the 1991 war was in terms of China’s estimate of the hegemonic
geopolitical objectives imputed to the Americans as underlying reasons for
war. In 2002–2003, Chinese analysts writing in elite foreign policy journals
argued that the real American motive for going to war to remove Saddam
Hussein was essentially the same in 1990: to seize control of Persian Gulf oil
so as to be able to coerce the consumers of that oil. Stated US concerns with
nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, terrorism, democratization, and so on
were all pretexts. The real US objective was world domination; Persian Gulf
oil was a means to that end. Dozens of articles developed variants of this
argument; only very occasionally did analysts credit professed US concern
about nuclear nonproliferation or terrorism.