Long Debate over the US Challenge } 639
forced to hand over to Hu Jintao the increasingly institutionalized position of
paramount leader, he was able to hang on to chairmanship of the CMC for
two more years largely on the grounds that that would enable him to continue
to safeguard the vital PRC-US relation.
Secretary of State Christopher in a May 1996 speech had proposed “regular
summit meetings” among several measures to improve Sino-American ties.
During a meeting at an APEC summit in Manila, Clinton and Jiang agreed
to an exchange, starting with a visit by Jiang in fall 1997. The Jiang-Clinton
meeting in Manila was the second between the two men and improved the
tone of the relationship. During their first meeting an APEC meeting in
Seattle in November 1993, Jiang had lectured Clinton at length on US trans-
gressions against China. Drawing on a stack of notecards, Jiang had turned
aside attempts by Clinton to direct the discussion along less confrontational
lines. At their Manila meeting, in contrast, the two men worked hard at over-
coming differences of culture and political belief to achieve a degree of rap-
port, based on a mutual understanding that the personal relation between the
two of them would, to some degree, set the tone for the relation between the
two countries.^5
Having scheduled a visit by Jiang to the United States, China’s MFA worked
hard to create a positive atmosphere for that visit by addressing US human
rights concerns, creating an image of modest relaxation of China’s internal
political controls. In March 1997, the MFA agreed to revive talks with the
International Committee of the Red Cross about periodic visitors to prisoners
held for political reasons. Those talks had been in abeyance since 1995. The
next month, Jiang told the visiting French defense minister that China would
sign the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by
the end of the year. Jiang signed the Covenant in October, just before his visit
to the United States. China also announced the deletion of the category of
“counterrevolutionary” offences from its criminal code. Jiang agreed to meet
with a delegation of US clerics for a discussion of religious freedom. Beijing
released and expelled Wei Jingsheng, China’s most prominent political pris-
oner, and revived a long-dormant dialogue on the treatment of Chinese po-
litical prisoners organized by US businessman John Kamm.^6 Chinese leaders
felt that US concern with China’s human rights affairs constituted interfer-
ence in China’s internal affairs. Yet the MFA recognized the political reality
of the significance of those concerns in the United States, and took pragmatic
moves to address and defuse them.
On the US side, concerns that things might go wrong with the Hong Kong
reversion at the end of June delayed finalization of the Jiang visit. Clinton
feared that the PLA might fire on Hong Kong demonstrations, that freedom
of press might be suspended, or that police would round up dissidents, among
other worries. If such things occurred, it would be embarrassing for Clinton
to be locked into a firm date for meeting with Jiang. When Hong Kong’s