Reassuring and Unnerving Japan } 727
territorial sea spiked in 2013, on three occasions PLAN warships maneuvered
near the islands, actions that a careful study by the US navy determined were
“signaling” to Japan.^45
Beijing’s tough handling of Senkaku disputes with Japan was popu-
lar with China’s nationalist public opinion. During the September 2010
confrontation over the detention of the Chinese fishing boat captain, the
purchase of Japanese-brand goods by Chinese consumers fell off consider-
ably. Japanese companies worried that the fall in sales would be perma-
nent. Chinese tourism to Japan also declined precipitously. Demonstrations
called for boycott of Japanese goods while condemning “Japanese bastards”
and “Japanese militarism.” But while Beijing’s pressure campaign proved
popular in China, in Japan it reinforced growing apprehension about
China’s increasing power. The fact that China’s high-pressure tactics against
Japan were successful did not reassure Japan—or other Asian countries for
that matter. Was this the way China would deal with territorial and other
disputes as its power grew? China’s neighbors asked. Again, some wise
heads in China worried that strident anti-Japanese sentiments might injure
China. Wu Jianmin, former ambassador to several European nations and to
the United Nations and ex-president of China’s Foreign Affairs University,
pleaded in an interview for a “rational” type of patriotism. Strained Sino-
Japanese relations would injure China’s development effort, Wu warned.^46
These moderate sentiments, while they may have been common among
China’s top leaders, did not reflect either mainstream public opinion or
Chinese policy.
Large, angry anti-Japanese street demonstrations erupted again in August
2012, when Japanese authorities detained and then deported a group of
Chinese activists who had landed on one of the Senkaku Islands. Protests
took place in a dozen east China cities. Chinese media reported the crowd
size at several hundred, but photos posted on websites showed vastly larger
crowds. When a group of Japanese activists swam ashore on one of the dis-
puted islands (also to be detained and sent home by the Japanese coast guard),
Chinese protests grew larger, more numerous, and angrier. Vicious banners
declared things like “Japan must be extinguished” and “Noda [then Japan’s
prime minister] must die.” Japanese-brand cars and Japanese stores, res-
taurants, and even factories were attacked. Demonstrations continued for a
week, spread to over eighty cities, and reached a peak on September 18, the
anniversary of the “Mukden Incident” in 1931. Streets full of angry demon-
strators scared some. An editor of Global Times, usually an outlet for strongly
nationalist views, urged restraint on the crowd: “Chinese people, please don’t
be overly angered by this. We should have more confidence and view Japan
from a global perspective.” On the other hand, Major General Luo Yuan sug-
gested the PLA declare the islands to be a bombing target range and plant
naval mines around them. Western journalists in Beijing speculated that the