792 { Notes to pages 59–63
- There are two aspects to state sovereignty under international law: actual ability to
control a piece of territory and the people who live there (de facto sovereignty) and recog-
nition as a member of the community of sovereign states by existing members of that com-
munity (de jure sovereignty). Broadly speaking, the PRC has deprived Taiwan of de jure
sovereignty since about 1971, but it has never exercised de facto sovereignty over Taiwan. - One of the most influential left-wing commentators of the 1950s and 1960s, I. F.
Stone, wrote a book marshalling the evidence behind this thesis, Hidden History of the
Korean War, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1951. One of the most detailed studies
of the origins of the war followed Stone in concluding that the North did not launch a
well-prepared and large-scale attack on the morning of June 25; instead, South Korea
and the United States probably provoked a Northern counterattack and the fighting then
spread to other sectors of the DMZ. See Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War,
Vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990,
pp. 568–621. Neither of these “revisionist” studies were able to make use of post-Soviet
documents on interactions between Kim, Stalin, and Mao. - Aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu cidian (Dictionary of patriotic education), Dalian: Dalian chu-
banshe, 1991, p. 472. - Zu guo wan sui (Long live the motherland), primary school textbook, Beijing: China
Youth Publishing Company, 1993, pp. 74–5. - When South Korean president Kim Young Sam visited Moscow in June 1994,
shortly after the normalization of Russian–South Korean relations, he asked Russian pres-
ident Boris Yeltsin to declassify documents dealing with the Korean War. Yeltsin agreed,
and 200 documents totaling 600 pages were delivered. These have progressively been made
available. These documents reveal Kim Il Sung’s prolonged efforts to secure Stalin’s and
Mao’s approval and material support for an offensive. The Cold War International History
Project (CWIHP) Bulletin published by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars has been the major English-language venue for their publication. - The Korean Communist Party renamed itself the Korean Worker’s Party in 1946 in
an attempt to give itself a seemingly broader appeal. - Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War,
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960. - This was the only Allied summit conference in which Chiang Kai-shek partici-
pated. Stalin refused to meet with Chiang out of fear it might provoke Japan to attack
Siberia, confronting the USSR with a two-front war. This was the conference at which
Taiwan was stripped from Japan’s sovereignty and returned to China. - Liu Xiaoyuan argued that more effective US-ROC cooperation during 1944–1945
could have avoided the tragedy of Korean division: Partnership for Disorder; China, the
United States and their Policies for Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941–1945,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. - Katherine Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean
War, 1945–1950: New Evidence From Russian Archives,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 8,
November 1993. - “On the Korean War,” Top Secret, for Brezhnev, Kosygin, et al., August 9, 1966. In
CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 15–6. - Sergei Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners,
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 134–35.