China\'s Quest. The History of the Foreign Relations of the People\'s Republic of China - John Garver

Notes to pages 64–76 } 793

14. US Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1950, pp. 111–2.


15. Goncharov, Uncertain Partners, p. 100.


16. Goncharov, Uncertain Partners, pp. 142–45.


17. Chen Jian, China’s Road, p. 112. According to Chen Jian, writing in 1994, no Chinese
    study has touched on the Kim-Mao meeting of May 13–16, 1950.


18. Soviet ambassador Nikolai Roshchin to Stalin, May 13, 1950, in CWIHP Bulletin,
    No. 4 (Fall 1994), p. 61.


19. “Filippov” (Stalin) to Mao Zedong, May 14, 1950, in “Documentation,” CWIHP
    Bulletin, Issue 4, Fall 1994, p. 61.


20. Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p. 146.


21. Katherine Weathersby makes this important point.


22. Four key works based on declassified Soviet documents generally agree on these
    events and were relied on for this section: Chen Jian, China’s Road. Weathersby, “Soviet
    Aims in Korea.” Goncharov et al, Uncertain Partners. Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military
    Romanticism; China and the Korean War, 1950–1953, Lawrence:  University of Kansas
    Press, 1995.


23. Chen Jian, China’s Road, p. 143.


24. Chen Jian, China’s Road, p. 171.


25. Chen Jian, China’s Road, p. 175.


26. Chen Jian, China’s Road, p. 182. Shu Guan Zhang argues that genuine and strong
    opposition to entry was expressed at this meeting. Military Romanticism, pp. 80–81.


27. Zhang, Military Romanticism, p. 78.


28. Zhang, Military Romanticism, p. 81.


29. Zhang, Military Romanticism, p. 85.


30. This section follows John Garver, The Sino-American Alliance; Nationalist China
    and U.S. Cold War Strategy in Asia, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997, pp. 15–21.


31. “Fall of Formosa Expected, Says U.S.,” New York Times, January 4, 1950.


32. Harry Truman Presidential Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org.


33. This section follows He Di, “The Last Campaign to Unify China:  The CCP’s
    Unmaterialized Plan to Liberate Taiwan, 1949–50,” Chinese Historians, Issue 5 (Spring
    1990), pp. 1–16.


34. He De, “The Last Campaign,” p. 11.


35. Goncharov et al. and Chen Jian disagree about whether Stalin agreed in mid-
    1949 to equip a Taiwan invasion force. Goncharov et al. say Stalin refused such aid and
    only changed his mind after the January 1950 clarification of US policy by Truman and
    Acheson. Chen Jian says that Stalin agreed to arm an invasion force during his July 1949
    talks with Liu Shaoqi, and that such equipment was arriving by September–October 1949.
    Uncertain Partners, pp. 98–101. China’s Road, p. 98. Given what we know of Stalin’s cau-
    tion in confronting the United States in Korea, I believe Goncharov’s account is more
    probable.


36. Document 173, Statement by President on the Situation in Korea, June 27, 1950.
    Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org.


37. Allen Whiting interpreted this initial and brief contact as a final Chinese warning.
    Chinese sources attribute the break to logistical difficulties.


38. This section follows Barbara Barnouin and Changgeng Yu, Zhou Enlai; A Political
    Life, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2006, pp. 148–9.


39. Barnouin and Yu, Zhou Enlai, pp. 148–9.