Notes to pages 192–202 } 805
- Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale,
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974. - Regarding Operation Gibraltar, see Mohammed Musa, My Version: India-Pakistan
War, 1965, Lahore: Wajidalis, 1983. S. M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, London: Oxford
University Press, 1973, pp. 326–8. Russel Brines, The Indo-Pakistan Conflict, 1965,
London: Pall Mall, 1968, pp. 301–3. - Regarding China and the 1965 India-Pakistan war, see Garver, Protracted Contest,
pp. 194–9. - Golam W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics
of a Divided Subcontinent, New York: Free Press, 1975, pp. 183–5. - Survey of the China Mainland Press, September 3, 1965, no. 3531, p. 34.
- Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of
National Liberation, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, p. 97. - Choudhury, India, Pakistan, pp. 189–91.
- This is the conclusion of Golam Choudhury based on a close study of Pakistani
materials. For a discussion of Choudhury’s conclusions and the historiography of China
and the 1965 war, see Garver, Protracted Contest, p. 411 note 47. - Choudhury, India, Pakistan, p. 191.
Chapter 8. Revolutionary China’s Quest to Transform Southeast Asia
- The document is available at many websites, e.g., https://www.marxists.org/refer-
ence/archive/lin-biao/1965/09/peoples_war/ch05.htm. The contrast between this state-
ment, issued under Lin Biao’s name, and another statement written to commemorate the
twentieth anniversary of Germany’s surrender of Germany in May 1965 and issued by
PLA chief of Staff Luo Ruiqing led many Western analysts to discern conflicting policy
prescriptions between Lin and Luo. Much scholarly attention was devoted to analyzing
this supposed “strategic debate.” Eventually, Chinese scholars ascertained that both state-
ments were closely edited, or even written, by Mao Zedong. - “More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” edito-
rial in Renmin ribao, December 29, 1956, in The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship
of the Proletariat, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1956, p. 28. - Chin Peng, My Side of History, Singapore: Media Matters, 2003, pp. 426, 430. Chin
Peng was the long-time secretary general of the Communist Party of Malaya. This is his
memoir. - Chen Peng, My Side, p. 440.
- William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, Boulder,
CO: Westview, 1981, pp. 186–8. - Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 112. - Mao’s theory of “protracted people’s war” outlined three states. In the first, “strate-
gic defensive” stage, revolutionary forces should concentrate on education, agitation, and
organizational work to build solid base areas. In the second state, of strategic stalemate,
revolutionary forces would undertake some “mobile operations” but still avoid direct
confrontation with enemy main units. Only in the final stage of “strategic offense” would
the revolutionary forces wage big battles with enemy main forces and seize enemy-held
cities.