China\'s Quest. The History of the Foreign Relations of the People\'s Republic of China - John Garver

(Steven Felgate) #1

Notes to pages 192–202 } 805



  1. Anwar H.  Syed, China and Pakistan:  Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale,
    Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974.

  2. Regarding Operation Gibraltar, see Mohammed Musa, My Version: India-Pakistan
    War, 1965, Lahore: Wajidalis, 1983. S. M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, London: Oxford
    University Press, 1973, pp. 326–8. Russel Brines, The Indo-Pakistan Conflict, 1965,
    London: Pall Mall, 1968, pp. 301–3.

  3. Regarding China and the 1965 India-Pakistan war, see Garver, Protracted Contest,
    pp. 194–9.

  4. Golam W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: Politics
    of a Divided Subcontinent, New York: Free Press, 1975, pp. 183–5.

  5. Survey of the China Mainland Press, September 3, 1965, no. 3531, p. 34.

  6. Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of
    National Liberation, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, p. 97.

  7. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, pp. 189–91.

  8. This is the conclusion of Golam Choudhury based on a close study of Pakistani
    materials. For a discussion of Choudhury’s conclusions and the historiography of China
    and the 1965 war, see Garver, Protracted Contest, p. 411 note 47.

  9. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, p. 191.


Chapter 8. Revolutionary China’s Quest to Transform Southeast Asia



  1. The document is available at many websites, e.g., https://www.marxists.org/refer-
    ence/archive/lin-biao/1965/09/peoples_war/ch05.htm. The contrast between this state-
    ment, issued under Lin Biao’s name, and another statement written to commemorate the
    twentieth anniversary of Germany’s surrender of Germany in May 1965 and issued by
    PLA chief of Staff Luo Ruiqing led many Western analysts to discern conflicting policy
    prescriptions between Lin and Luo. Much scholarly attention was devoted to analyzing
    this supposed “strategic debate.” Eventually, Chinese scholars ascertained that both state-
    ments were closely edited, or even written, by Mao Zedong.

  2. “More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” edito-
    rial in Renmin ribao, December 29, 1956, in The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship
    of the Proletariat, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1956, p. 28.

  3. Chin Peng, My Side of History, Singapore: Media Matters, 2003, pp. 426, 430. Chin
    Peng was the long-time secretary general of the Communist Party of Malaya. This is his
    memoir.

  4. Chen Peng, My Side, p. 440.

  5. William J.  Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, Boulder,
    CO: Westview, 1981, pp. 186–8.

  6. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975, Chapel Hill:  University of
    North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 112.

  7. Mao’s theory of “protracted people’s war” outlined three states. In the first, “strate-
    gic defensive” stage, revolutionary forces should concentrate on education, agitation, and
    organizational work to build solid base areas. In the second state, of strategic stalemate,
    revolutionary forces would undertake some “mobile operations” but still avoid direct
    confrontation with enemy main units. Only in the final stage of “strategic offense” would
    the revolutionary forces wage big battles with enemy main forces and seize enemy-held
    cities.

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