43o POLSKA LUDOWApoint had always been presented to the world as 'a non-party man'. His depar-
ture removed the last obstacle to the formation of the PZPR in December.
Gomulka's fall was clearly the result of direct Soviet intervention in Polish
Party affairs. A commentator who called it 'The Pacification of Polish
Communism' was not very far from the mark. Yet to the best of their ability,
Gomutka's comrades cushioned his defeat. He stayed on as Vice-Premier until
January 1949, and as a member of the Central Committee until November of the
same year. He was never put on trial, nor handed over to the mercies of Soviet
justice. His act of defiance was not forgotten when the Polish Party reasserted
its independence in 1956.^25
After three-and-a-half years of peacetime, the construction of the People's
Democracy in the Soviet image was virtually complete. A monolithic Leninist
Party was establishing its monopoly. The identity of interests between Party and
State was incarnate in the person of Bierut, who straddled the twin thrones of
First-Secretary and President. The success of the communists had proved far
easier than anyone in 1945 had supposed. In retrospect, it is less surprising.
Contrary to what was assumed at the time in western countries, there was never
a period in Poland when free competition between the communist movement
and the non-communist parties was permitted. Power passed directly and
smoothly from the German Occupation Forces to the Soviet Army, from the
Soviet Army directly to the Soviet-controlled Provisional Government, and, at
the time of Elections in 1947, from the TRJN to the PPR. For this reason, it is
quite out of place to talk of a communist 'seizure of power' or a 'communist
takeover'. The communists were handed Poland on a platter, and successfully
obstructed all attempts to share power thereafter. Nor was there ever any need
to impose Communism on Poland by force. It is quite beside the point that Stalin
was a cruel, ruthless politician devoid of all sense of magnanimity or generosity.
As events actually happened, all the elements which might conceivably have
mounted organized resistance in Poland, had already been eliminated. They had
been discredited by pre-war or wartime failures; deserted by the Allied Powers;
or destroyed by the Warsaw Rising. In 1944-8 there was no one left - apart from
Mikolajczyk and a few scattered and leaderless remnants of the AK - who might
have opposed the communists. Stalin was given what he wanted without a
struggle. Such violence as did occur, at the instigation of the NKGB, was polit-
ically superfluous. It is equally mistaken to talk of 'a concerted communist
conspiracy'. Despite the affectation of monolithic solidarity, the Polish
communist movement differed from the Soviets on many essential issues, and
was deeply divided against itself. There was no agreement about the speed of
direction of their socialist programme, still less about methods and means; no
rigid conformity to a master-plan or blueprint. Both Poles and Soviets were feel-
ing their way forward in a very uncertain and confusing situation. Indeed, one
could say more. The end result, when Stalin was left ruling Poland through his
reserve team of faceless puppets, was as much a failure for him as for the Polish
communists themselves.