205 divisions, but 60 were not available for the war in the East: 3 8 were deployed in
France, 12 in Norway, 1 in Denmark, 7 in the Balkans and 1 in North Africa.
This was to be the war of decision for Germany. It is true that Hitler chose to wage
war on two fronts (actually three, given the Mediterranean complications wished on him
by Mussolini), but the unfinished strategic business with Britain should not matter for
long, given the near-universal expectation of swift victory in the East. Planning for
the attack on Russia began in July 1940, well before the outcome of the Battle of Britain
was known. When Russia was defeated, it was reasoned, Britain’s strategic position as
an active belligerent would be hopeless. Traditionally, Britain required a ‘Continental
sword’ to complement its maritime power. In 1940, Britain’s French sword had snapped,
while in mid-1941 Hitler, and nearly everybody else, expected its de factoSoviet sword
to snap also. At that time the United States was not a strategic factor of much signifi-
cance, and Germany’s conquest of Russia would pose an Anglo-American alliance a
strategic challenge beyond their joint ability to meet.
Some claim that the German Army and Air Force were delayed from launching
Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia, for perhaps a month in May 1941 by the
need to rescue Italy from an unfolding strategic disaster in Greece, as well as in North
Africa: 15 May had been the date chosen for the invasion. Hitler did not much care
strategically about the Mediterranean, but he did care about the reputation for military
competence of his Italian ally, and he felt at least some sense of personal obligation to
his fellow dictator. Content to stave off disaster in the desert for Italy, as well as humili-
ation in the Balkans, where Hitler had at least one truly vital interest, the oil field at
Ploesti in Romania, the Führer was obliged to settle for containment of his open-ended
British problem. Britain would be coerced by bombing and by the maritime blockade
enforced by Dönitz’s U-boats. However, the main event, the one to which all other strands
of the conflict would be subordinate, was the conquest of Russia.
For all its excellence as a fighting machine, the German Army was traditionally weak
in the fields of intelligence and logistics. Superior training, class-leading doctrine, high
morale, and tactical and operational skills were what really counted in German military
estimation. Staff training emphasized the overriding importance of the operational
concept. Intelligence on the enemy was somewhat discounted, because apart from its
often inherent uncertainty, a German Army with the initiative would deny the foe the
opportunity to recover from initial defeats and regroup in order to implement its own
plans. As for logistical problems, while they could slow or even halt offensive action for
a while, as in 1914, 191 8 and even 1940, it was an item of faith that improvised solutions
somehow would always be found. Logistical calculation tended to fade into a vague
realm of hope, even among the supposedly highly professional German General Staff.
However, a swift glance at a map of Eastern Europe reveals that from the perspective
of an invader from the west, Russia is shaped like an ever-widening funnel. The deeper
an invader plunges into Russia, the wider becomes the battle space. An invading army
of 145 German divisions is a mighty concentration of power, but if that army takes
heavy losses and is committed to combat from Leningrad on the Baltic to the foothills
of the Caucasus, it readily becomes apparent that it is likely to be far too small for its
operational tasks.
The strategic story of 1941 is keyed to a deadly lack of German operational focus.
The Soviet Union was to be defeated in a single campaign, but how and where should
132 War, peace and international relations