jousted creatively. But in Chapter 11 of Book 3 of On War, Clausewitz sounds distinctly
Jominian:
The best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive
point. Apart from the effort needed to create military strength, which does not always
emanate from the general, there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of
keeping one’s forces concentrated. No force should ever be detached from the main
body unless the need is definite and urgent. We hold fast to this principle, and regard
it as a reliable guide.
(Clausewitz, 1976: 204; emphasis in original)Sad to say, much as many of Clausewitz’s critics over the years have seized upon
isolated sentences and paragraphs, quite out of their context in On War, in order to
support their views, so Jomini also has been, and continues to be, considerably
misrepresented. Although Clausewitz stands head and shoulders higher in theoretical
merit than Jomini, there are many similarities between their writings. Indeed, one can
extend the point to assert that in addition to there being elements common to Clausewitz
and Jomini, one finds strategic ideas in Sun-tzu’s Art of War, written in China around
400 BC, compatible with those of the nineteenth-century theorists (Sun-tzu, 1994). The
most careful scholarly comparison extant of the writings of Clausewitz, Jomini and
Clausewitz and the theory of war 21Box 2.1The principles of war
Principle Definition
Mass Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time.
Objective Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined,
decisive and attainable objective.
Offensive Seize, retain and exploit the initiative.
Surprise Strike the enemy at a time, at a place or in a manner for
which he is unprepared.
Economy of force Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary
efforts.
Manoeuvre Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the
flexible application of combat power.
Unity of command For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one
responsible commander.
Security Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected
advantage.
Simplicity Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise
orders to ensure thorough understanding.Source: US Army, Field Manual FM3-0, Operations(2001)