28 War, peace and international relations
Box 2.2Important subjects deliberately omitted from or treated only
briefly in On War
Time and again in the text, attention is drawn to the range and power of
Clausewitz’s general theory of war and strategy. In some contrast, here I present
some important matters that On Wardoes not discuss adequately; or, in one case
at least (sea power), at all. There were good reasons why Clausewitz chose not to
dwell on these subjects – good reasons to him, that is. However, as the history
chapters that follow this one explain, such neglect would not always have benign
consequences. Contrary to appearances, perhaps, these points are not raised
as criticism of On War, but rather simply to draw attention to topics on which
Clausewitz’s theory could benefit from some augmentation. (Matters which
Clausewitz could not possibly have anticipated – for example, the effect on war of
a globalized electronic mass media – are omitted from the list.)- Grand strategy: On Warpresents a general theory of war and military strategy,
but it does not attempt to deal with the non-military aspects of strategy and
war-making. Given the significance of the economic warfare waged between
Britain and France during the Napoleonic Wars, this is a notable, and arguably
damaging, certainly limiting, omission. - Logistics:Chapters 14 and 15 of Book 5 discuss supply and movement, as
do the other chapters of that book in passing. But logistics is not accorded
high significance in the theory of war. For two centuries the Prussian–German
‘way of war’ privileged the operational concept over questions of logistical
feasibility. - Raising an army: On Warsimply assumes that armies are raised. Clausewitz
himself likened that activity to the art of sword-making, and commented that
his book was about the use of the sword. - Sea power:There are only two references to sea power in On War(pp. 220,
634), neither of them substantive. This may not matter, given that the book
provides a general theory of war. Necessarily, it also lacks discussion of air
power and nuclear weapons! However, given the profound significance of
British sea power in the warfare of 1793–1 8 15, it is at least possible that
Clausewitz might have devised a somewhat different theory of war, had he
been educated in maritime topics. - Technology: On Wardoes not discuss technology; certainly, it does not even
hint at the possibility that technological change might be significant. Dying in
18 31, Clausewitz narrowly missed the onset of the Industrial Revolution on
the Continent. His theory of war is protected from instant obsolescence by this
silence on technology, but readers of On Warneed to be alert to the absence of
this subject. - Intelligence:Clausewitz, in some contrast to Napoleon, was fairly disdainful
of intelligence. In his experience, it tended to be contradictory, false, or
missing when needed. In common with logistics, intelligence would prove to
be a persisting weakness in the German way of war.