coalition of divergent interests. In such a political context, the substitution of men and
enthusiasm for professional skill proved just sufficient to keep out the enemies. Tactics
typically were crude, but effective. This is a point with relevance throughout the historical
domain of this book. Successful strategy is strategy that works well enough. There is no
requirement from some Law of Strategy that one must win elegantly. It is sufficient
simply to win. Some professionally disadvantaged armies can find ways to offset their
lack of skill. Moreover, the longer a war lasts, the more even become the skills of the
rival belligerents.
The political context for the strategic history of the early and mid-1790s could not
endure. Regime succeeded regime in Paris, each more extreme than its predecessor. The
liberal dream of liberty, equality and fraternity turned into the nightmare of the Jacobin
Terror. In a dark hour of national strategic peril, the Jacobins conducted ‘the Reign of
Terror’ from September 1793 to June 1794, organized by Maximilien Robespierre on
behalf of the menacingly titled Committee of Public Safety. The Reign of Terror claimed
40,000 lives, and it was in that atmosphere that the levée en massewas first introduced,
on 23 August 1793 as already mentioned. It produced 300,000 men and allowed for the
creation of eleven armies.
The political context just described, one characterized by chaos, panic, extremism and
genuine foreign and domestic threats, provided the perfect launch pad for the opportu-
nistic adventurer. If he was extraordinarily competent, that was a bonus, while he needed
to be lucky in order to survive the lethal uncertainties of revolutionary politics. The rise,
and further rise, of the Corsican Napoleon Bonaparte was the product of revolutionary
chaos, but he might well have gone to the guillotine had luck not been with him. As it
was, he survived the fall of patrons and a period of imprisonment (August–September
1794). Nevertheless, Napoleon took full advantage of the unique opportunities for self-
advancement which a revolutionary political context offered. He prospered because the
government of the Directory (1795–9) repeatedly needed him. Politicians in distress need
the aid of a strong, utterly ruthless and competent military hand. Napoleon was more than
willing to oblige. Just as Stalin was made by the Russian Revolution, which was enabled
only by World War I, while Hitler as Führer is inconceivable except in the context of a
Germany transformed politically by that same conflict, so Napoleon was the product of
the French Revolution.
Napoleon’s art of war
If this were a military, rather than a strategic, history, it would be obliged to devote
extensive attention to Napoleon’s dazzling achievements in warfare. It is true that those
achievements were by no means unblemished by error, but a record of close to fifty
battlefield victories still speaks for itself. The size of his reputation, and the indisputable
fact that he has the truly rare distinction of lending his name to an era, also attest to
Napoleon’s stature in public consciousness, if not always public esteem. But, as a
strategic historian, one might argue that Napoleon was not only strategically incompetent
but grossly and murderously strategically irresponsible. Napoleon’s art of war was indeed
impressive, but what was it for? What was the plot? Since war should not serve itself, to
what end, with what political consequences, was the Emperor’s military genius applied?
That is the plot, and it is a plot with a story arc and conclusion of ultimate, and almost
From limited war to national war 39