• previously been made by Ambassador Gleysteen and others such as
Brewster. These included the importance of civilian control of the military,
progress toward democratization, and adherence to Central Forces Com-
mand OPCON procedures. By now, however, more than two months had
passed since /, and Chun was in a much stronger position.
The American and Korean sides had somewhat different accounts of this
meeting. The Americans felt that it had been generally satisfactory, although
Wickham reported later to Washington that he was not certain that he had
made any positive impression on Chun. The Korean version of the meeting
was that it was dominated by Chun, who despite his status as the junior
officer, lectured Wickham about the realities of the Korean peninsula, dis-
missed his concerns somewhat abruptly, and was condescending and almost
arrogant in his manner. I was not personally present, but from discussing
the meeting with others, I tend to believe that the Korean version is more
accurate. At any rate, the talk was hardly a success from any perspective
and probably only served to make worse the personal relationship between
the two men, which was not good to begin with.
I have never believed that USFK handled its overall relations with the ROK
Army very skillfully during this period. Its intentions were good, but even
two months after /, American officers continued to pound away on the
OPCON issue at every opportunity. By now, even the officers who were anti-
Chun had heard enough about OPCON. Also, the order not to discuss politi-
cal matters with Korean officers had been taken to extremes. This had been
expanded in practice to preclude even talking with members of the U.S.
Embassy concerning what ROK officers might be thinking or rumors that a
U.S. officer might have heard. The net effect of this was to reduce the U.S.
government’s level of understanding about what the rank-and-file Korean
military officers were thinking. Thus, our appreciation for the overall ROK
military point of view tended to be framed by what Chun was telling
Brewster or by what I was learning from my contacts, many of whom were
Chun supporters. Unfortunately we missed the opportunity to get a broader
perspective from wider sources. This probably would not have made any
difference in later events, but we might have used a broader sample of opin-
ion to find ways to reduce Chun’s support in the army, which might have
influenced him to take more moderate actions when the political situation
deteriorated in late April and May.
The bad personal relationship between Generals Wickham and Chun was
also unfortunate. Obviously it would have been difficult for the two men,
who had far different personalities, to have been close friends. But both had