w aging w ar to t ransform the w orld 91Wilson resumed his search for a negotiated peace, a quest that would
continue until American entry into the war. By 1916 his vision broad-
ened to include the creation of a system of collective security that would
off er an alternative to war. Such a mechanism would involve the United
States, thereby marking an end to the nation’s historic isolation from
global affairs, though he tried to downplay the departure from
tradition. ^
Th e president made public his vision of a new international system
in a speech on May 27, 1916, a speech that also pledged support for the
ideals of government by some form of popular consent and freedom
from aggression. Th us, well before American policy makers seriously
entertained the idea of direct participation in the war, Wilson contem-
plated how he might play a role in ending it in a way that would
prevent future large-scale confl ict. He issued a stirring call for “peace
without victory” in January 1917 that included a pledge that the United
States would join other nations to guarantee that peace would be
maintained.
For all of Wilson’s sincere eff orts to bring an end to the war, his ini-
tiatives would stimulate nothing more than an elaborate diplomatic
charade by the other players. None of the belligerents had a serious
interest in following up on his overtures. As the cost of the war increased
and casualties reached incomprehensible totals, the warring govern-
ments concluded that their people would accept nothing less than
victory for the sacrifi ces they had made. Great Britain and France
negotiated secret agreements about how to divide the spoils they would
wring from their beaten enemies to compensate their own citizens for
the deprivations they were enduring. Th ey also made promises about
territorial gains to other nations, such as Italy, to induce them to enter
the war on the side of the Entente. As they cut deals among them-
selves, leaders of the combatants paid lip service to American eff orts to
broker peace. Th ey hoped that the onus for failure would fall on their
adversaries, who would state terms so extreme that Wilson himself
would be forced to admit they could not be accepted. After winning
reelection in 1916 as the peace candidate, he renewed his call for nego-
tiations and asked the two sides to state their minimum conditions for
peace. Berlin, while evading the president’s request to state peace terms,
announced a readiness to negotiate, putting the Allies on the spot.