94 e lusive v ictories
critics observed, this was entirely inadequate for an actual war and
larger than necessary for peace.
In contrast with the president’s lack of interest in building a major
modern army, the administration did take certain steps to enlarge
the U.S. Navy and to prepare for the mobilization of economic
resources in the event of war. Th e president threw his political weight
behind a bill to accelerate the construction of capital ships (battle-
ships and battle cruisers) and expand the number of smaller vessels.
Again the initial benefi t was political, because it would be several
years before the ships would be ready. Just as bad, they would be the
wrong kinds of vessels: the measure, drafted by battleship admirals,
took little account of the growing submarine menace. American
leaders also realized that war would increase the demand for strategic
resources and require government direction of economic activities to
an unprecedented degree. With this in mind, the National Defense
Act included a provision to establish a cabinet-level Council of
National Defense to prepare for economic mobilization should war
erupt.
Wilson secured his reelection by a narrow margin, aided by his deft
response to the preparedness movement, but found himself at a diplo-
matic dead end and subject to the policy choices of other nations.
Despite his eff ort to use his good offi ces to broker an acceptable peace
agreement, the warring alliances had staked out positions that could
not be bridged. Neither would concede that victory was impossible or
not worth the cost. At the same time, each experienced a rising sense of
desperation, as nations reached the limits of their available manpower,
foodstuff s began to run short, and political discontent percolated just
below the surface. Finally, in Germany, a government reluctant to
antagonize the United States gave way to one that heeded military
demands to halt shipping to Great Britain. Th e German naval command
expressed confi dence that its U-boats could force the British people
into starvation before the United States could put suffi cient forces into
the fi eld to make a diff erence. When the Allies responded to Wilson’s
December 1916 call with extreme peace terms that would have
amounted to a German surrender, Berlin decided the following month
to initiate unrestricted submarine warfare, announcing the decision on
February 1, 1917.