Elusive Victories_ The American Presidency at War-Oxford University Press (2012)

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102 e lusive v ictories


American troops were sent over quickly and incorporated into British
and French units. British Major General George T. M. Bridges went so
far as to propose that a half million American men be inducted, sent
directly to England for training, and then sent as individual replace-
ments to British units.  No American president would accept such a
subordinate role, especially not Wilson, who saw at once the need for
an American expeditionary force to make a clear, indisputable mark
that would give him the political capital he would need in the subse-
quent peace negotiations. Grudgingly, the Allied military missions con-
ceded the point, though this would hardly end debate over how
American troops should be used. 
Having settled the matter of whether to send an army, the Wilson
administration next faced the same task that had confronted the
Lincoln administration in 1861—to put the requisite force in the fi eld
as quickly as possible. Although some of the framework had been estab-
lished by the earlier preparedness summer camps and the 1916 legis-
lation, the task would take time. Apart from the initial detachment
designed to show the fl ag, an actual fi eld army would not be available
before mid-1918, and army planners anticipated that American numbers
would not be decisive until 1919. 
As Lincoln had, Wilson faced a key decision: whom to place in
command of this nascent expeditionary corps. Wilson believed that
once chosen, this officer should be given great latitude in how he
directed his troops. From the president’s reading of history, Lincoln had
interfered far too much in how his generals conducted their business.
Wilson intended a much more “hands off ” approach.  But that meant
that the commander he selected would have to understand the admin-
istration’s political objectives and be prepared to operate in manner
designed to accomplish them. He needed, in short, to be a reliable
agent. Th at ruled out someone such as the controversial former Army
Chief of Staff Leonard Wood, who had been a strident proponent of
American preparedness against the wishes of his commander in chief.
Wood, a Republican closely associated with former President Th eodore
Roosevelt, also harbored known presidential aspirations, and Wilson
was no more eager to enhance the prospects of a potential competitor
than Lincoln had been. Instead, the president selected Major General
John J. “Black Jack” Pershing, who had recently commanded the Villa

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