178 e lusive v ictories
other senior offi cers preferred seizure of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Th e
matter might have been resolved within the military through compro-
mises, especially since the loss of American airfi elds in eastern China in
the previous months meant the Formosa option would yield fewer mil-
itary returns and little was expected by this point of Chiang Kai-shek’s
forces. But 1944 was an election year, and the president faced another
campaign. Indeed, the Hawaii conference functioned in part as an
opportunity for the president to be photographed with his victorious
commanders, much to the chagrin of MacArthur and King, who
disliked being turned into campaign props.
But MacArthur knew how to play the political card, too. Th e general
told his commander in chief that the American people would never
stand for abandoning the Philippines after its people had fought so
hard for the United States at the start of the war. Perhaps “blackmail” is
too strong, but the implied threat—in Max Hastings’s words, “the
general’s political friends would raise a storm among American
voters”—was not lost on the president. Given the lack of a clear mil-
itary rationale for an alternative, the political calculations likely tipped
the balance. MacArthur got his invasion, with full support from the
navy.
As often happens in war, the decision had unforeseen consequences,
some salutary but others not. Th e invasion of Leyte in September 1944
drew out most of the remaining Japanese fl eet for an epic clash in Leyte
Gulf. Th e U.S. Navy destroyed what remained of Japanese sea power.
But once started on his campaign to reclaim the archipelago, Mac Arthur
would not stop. His liberation continued with a series of landings and
engagements that led to heavy American casualties and far greater losses
among the civilian population, while doing nothing to speed the end of
the war. Th e violence was pointless—the Philippines would be fully
liberated when the Japanese surrendered, without MacArthur’s ongoing
ego off ensive. Still, Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs declined to incur the
political price of arousing the general’s friends to stop him.
While American forces advanced across the Pacifi c toward Japan, a
separate war was waged by the Allies in the Far East in what they desig-
nated the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater. Militarily, it meant little
to the outcome of the war against Japan, which is why the theater
command received the fewest resources of any Allied front. On the