f reedom of a ction 179other hand, in political terms, the region mattered greatly to leaders in
Great Britain and the United States. Both Roosevelt and Churchill saw
the CBI theater as vital to the postwar order within the region and
beyond, though their visions for the future were very diff erent.
Roosevelt, as we’ve seen, intended that China play the part of a great
power, one of the Big Four, in his postwar order. He fi rst sought to
supply the Nationalist armies so they could tie down major Japanese
forces. But Chiang Kai-shek had his own agenda, one that did not
include risking his troops against a Japanese enemy they had failed time
and again to defeat in battle. No amount of aid or cajoling by American
emissaries could make him fi ght. Th e sober realization that China
could contribute little to Allied victory prompted Roosevelt to cancel a
planned amphibious operation across the Bay of Bengal in 1943 to
recapture Rangoon and reopen the Burma Road—one of the rare times
he overruled his own military chiefs. Th e president also believed long-
range bombers in eastern China might strike directly at Japan. At enor-
mous expense, airfi elds were constructed, only to be captured easily in
1944 by Japanese troops. Still, it served the president’s long-term
political purposes to prop up Chiang, so both leaders continued the
pretense that China was contributing to the Allied cause.
Roosevelt also aimed to prevent the reestablishment of colonial
control in Southeast Asia, putting him directly at odds with Churchill.
Versions of international trusteeships for erstwhile colonial holdings
had been under discussion among leaders of the Big Four since 1943 but
faced British and French objections. Th e president refused to approve
the addition of French offi cers to the Allied command in Southeast Asia
because he feared it would signal a commitment to restore French
control over postwar Indochina. He hoped to see Chiang’s government
assume some kind of temporary stewardship over the former French
colony, in keeping with China’s anticipated role as a major power. (For
his part, the generalissimo preferred immediate independence for
Indochina, expecting it would fall permanently under Chinese
dominance.)
In stark contrast, Churchill maintained that the old colonial order
could be reestablished and preserved. The British leader refused to
concede Indian independence, despite evident popular support for the
Congress Party and its program. Churchill also intended to use India