f reedom of a ction 185Poland because he needed to mollify the large number of Polish Ameri-
cans. Th e president risked provoking the same kind of disillusionment
that had helped defeat Wilson’s peace treaty and that later fed
isolationism.
Unlike Europe, where the United States never dominated the war
against Germany, the Pacifi c counteroff ensive against Japan was over-
whelmingly an American enterprise. American military leaders were
divided over the benefi ts of retaining this near-monopoly. Late in the
war, Churchill sought a larger British role, principally so Great Britain
might earn through its sacrifi ces its title to its former colonial holdings.
Admiral King opposed the prime minister’s off er of a British fl eet to
support Pacifi c amphibious operations, raising weak logistical objec-
tions. At heart, King sought to minimize the role of any other power in
shaping the postwar Asia-Pacifi c order. But the president overruled
him—he could never have explained to the American public why, in
the face of appalling losses in the late war Pacifi c battles, he had refused
Allied help—and a large British fl eet entered the war against Japan in
the fi nal months.
How best to end the war in the Pacifi c quickly and with the least loss
of American lives was the issue that vexed American political and mil-
itary leaders in 1945. They hoped to avoid a direct invasion of the
Japanese home islands and bring about surrender instead through
blockade and strategic bombing. However, although the Japanese mil-
itary already had been cut off from its sources of vital strategic materials
and Tokyo and other cities were being reduced to ashes by B-29 fi re-
bombing, the Japanese leadership gave no sign it was ready to quit. Th e
rigidity of the “unconditional surrender” formula sparked new debates
among senior American offi cials. Military commanders feared it would
prolong the war by encouraging Japanese resistance, and they worried
that the heavy casualties suff ered during an invasion would damage
both military and civilian morale for little gain over what might be
achieved with slightly more fl exible terms. State Department offi cials
countered that no other formula could give the Allies eff ective control
over Japan, which was necessary to assure the demilitarization of
Japanese society. Amid this impasse, Roosevelt at Yalta secured a
promise from Stalin to enter the war against Japan three months after
Germany surrendered. Meanwhile, secret development of the atomic