s taying the c ourse 203His paranoia about antiwar critics, moreover, backfi red in the political
scandal that eventually doomed him, and with that removed the slim
chance that the United States might intervene again to punish enemy
violations of the peace agreement by which American forces left the
conflict. Vietnam represented the nadir of wartime presidential
leadership.
From the moment Johnson assumed offi ce, Vietnam hovered over
him. He reaffi rmed the commitment made by his two predecessors to
sustain the noncommunist regime in South Vietnam against a growing
insurgency backed by communist North Vietnam. Sharing the conven-
tional wisdom that no communist threat could be ignored, he opted to
escalate the scale of American intervention. At the same time he failed
to clarify American national interests in going to war, refused to choose
between costly domestic and military commitments, did not explain
American objectives clearly to the public, and never defi ned a coherent
military strategy that would force the communist adversary to accept a
political solution on his terms.
In short, Johnson quickly surrendered his freedom of action. By
1967, senior administration offi cials concluded that the war had become
a stalemate, a treacherous political situation for a wartime leader. Elite
and public opinion at home began to turn against Johnson. Th e pres-
ident and his key military commanders compounded their diffi culties
by claiming by late 1967 that American troops had turned the tide.
When Hanoi launched its Tet Offensive in early 1968, the attacks,
though a military debacle for the communists, undercut the Johnson
administration’s assertion of progress and ultimately ended his fading
quest for reelection. Negotiations to fi nd a political solution fi nally
began in his last months in offi ce.
Richard Nixon inherited the military stalemate and fi tful peace talks,
but as a new president he regained a measure of latitude. When
campaigning for the White House in 1968, he had pledged to pursue
“peace with honor” in Vietnam, a vague stance that ruled out only
immediate withdrawal or all-out war. Over the next several years, his
administration shifted the burden of fi ghting to the South Vietnamese
and reduced American troop levels. But Nixon found it hard to give up
the ghost of victory. Several times he ordered the use of increased force
in a futile eff ort to bully the communist leadership in Hanoi to bow to