210 e lusive v ictories
were suspect, but still it exercised a powerful grip on both the elite and
popular imagination. In February 1965, an opinion poll found that four
out of fi ve Americans believed that a withdrawal from Vietnam would
result in a communist takeover of all of Southeast Asia.
Important though Vietnam might be, from this perspective, the war
there also had to be kept within bounds. Neither the United States nor
the major communist powers wanted direct conflict, which could
quickly spin out of control. Both sides had been sobered by the Cuban
Missile Crisis, which had pushed the world perilously close to the brink
of nuclear Armageddon. China would enter the nuclear club in 1964.
From that point forward, American leaders had to reckon with the like-
lihood that a confrontation might escalate to the nuclear level.
Moreover, if the war in Vietnam came too close to China, Beijing
might intervene with conventional forces. Still fresh in the memory of
American policy makers was the Korean War. When UN forces
approached the Yalu River that separated China from North Korea in
October 1950, General Douglas MacArthur had dismissed indications
that the Chinese would send troops to assure the survival of their North
Korean ally. Massive Chinese attacks then infl icted a stunning opera-
tional defeat on MacArthur and extended the war for several years. To
preserve its credibility among national liberation movements, China
could not allow the collapse of North Vietnam. Although it was not
possible to know just what might provoke the Chinese to enter the
Vietnam War, prudence dictated that the United States avoid certain
military actions likely to compel Beijing to respond. For example, the
Korean precedent suggested the Chinese would defend a communist
buff er state on their border. Accordingly, the Johnson administration
ruled out any attempt at regime change in Hanoi.
Balancing the risks, the president saw that only a narrow course
remained open to the United States in Vietnam. Johnson, encouraged
by most of his civilian and military advisors, concluded that the United
States needed to meet the communist challenge at its most threatening
point, in the jungles of Southeast Asia, but in a way that would contain
the confl ict. Th e underlying rot of the Saigon government made it a
poor bet, one that would need much help before it could stand on its
own. Nevertheless, withdrawal would be worse, for it would undermine
American prestige and initiate the terminal retreat of the West before