218 e lusive v ictories
stated the situation in terms that echoed the Korean precedent: “Th e
fi rst reality is that North Viet-Nam has attacked the independent nation
of South Viet-Nam. Its object is total conquest.” The United States
would assist South Vietnam in meeting this aggression. “Our objective
is the independence of South Viet-Nam, and its freedom from attack.”
Th e young nation must be guaranteed the opportunity to shape its own
future and its relations with the rest of the world. Without specifying
what an independent South Vietnamese state would look like, the pres-
ident made clear that the United States would not withdraw “under the
cloak of a meaningless agreement.” Political expedients such as neutral-
ization did not meet the test of independence.
Of course, the situation in South Vietnam was by no means as
straightforward as the South Korea parallel implied. Johnson acknowl-
edged that a substantial domestic insurgency threatened the collapse of
the Saigon government. Yet that should not be permitted to defl ect
attention from the real struggle: the war continued because of a steady
stream of men and supplies from North Vietnam. More critically, the
aggression drew upon a larger and far more dangerous wellspring. “Th e
confused nature of this confl ict,” Johnson continued, “cannot mask
the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.” Communist China, the
source of much of the violence across the globe, lurked behind the
aggression in Vietnam, urging on the leaders in Hanoi. Th is external
pressure invested the confl ict with more than local signifi cance. At stake
in Vietnam was international stability writ large, and the United States
remained determined to preserve world order.
Beyond guaranteeing the independence of South Vietnam, Johnson
identifi ed a second fundamental national objective. Every president
since 1954 had pledged to maintain the integrity of South Vietnam.
American credibility was therefore at stake. By halting aggression at this
point, the United States would reassure other nations that relied upon
American security guarantees, and thereby check the possibility that
disorder and violence would spread across Southeast Asia and beyond.
The sanctity of our word, Johnson insisted, meant that the United
States did not have the luxury of choosing when it might be too dif-
fi cult or costly to uphold it. We would demonstrate that we had the
means and will to meet aggression in any place in the world, even one
as admittedly unpromising as South Vietnam.