220 e lusive v ictories
Asia, and the Pacifi c, if it became bogged down in Vietnam. Th us, by
upholding promises to Saigon, other American guarantees became less
credible. Johnson compounded the danger that American military
means would not suffi ce to meet multiple security challenges, more-
over, by his determination to press ahead with the Great Society
program. In eff ect, he gambled that Southeast Asia would be the only
place where the steadfastness of the United States and its allies would be
tested.
Finally, the war goals that Johnson established presumed that the
American people would share his willingness for a protracted confl ict in
which the full military power of the nation could not be deployed.
Reminding his fellow countrymen that the confl ict required “the will to
endure,” he asserted that success would come when the communist
adversary realized that “our patience and our determination are
unending.” He asked, in short, that the American people bear the
sacrifi ces of war indefi nitely. Th ere was an obvious tension between his
eff orts to downplay the war by refusing to make it the centerpiece of
administration policy and the potential cost Americans would be called
upon to pay. Further, as Korea had demonstrated, public patience
would be severely tested by a limited war and the accompanying
political restrictions on how the American military could apply force.
American ideas of victory had been shaped by the experience of the
Second World War, in which the destruction and occupation of the
enemy’s homeland had served as clear markers of success. General
Douglas MacArthur had tapped this memory when he had challenged
the Truman policy in Korea by proclaiming that “there is no substitute
for victory.” If the enemy proved resilient and the confl ict dragged on,
the president would face mounting public pressure to make full use of
American military power and expand the scope of the confl ict. Popular
frustration might outweigh the abstract concern about provoking inter-
vention by the major communist powers.
No Meeting of the Minds
Johnson enjoyed an advantage over every one of his wartime prede-
cessors in that he would not have to wait for the creation of a substan-
tial military establishment. How suitable that force was for the Vietnam