248 e lusive v ictories
strong economic incentive to cooperate. In the April 1965 Johns
Hopkins University speech in which he laid out American war aims,
the president also offered American funding for a massive regional
Mekong River development project that he regarded as the foundation
for prosperity across an impoverished Southeast Asia. Th e idea repre-
sented a twist on the New Deal Tennessee Valley Authority, which
Johnson saw as the cornerstone of economic progress in the American
South. From the perspective of a canny politician like the president, the
off er would be too good for Ho Chi Minh and company to resist—give
up the dream of conquest, fated now to be thwarted by American might
and resolve, for the sure thing of economic development.
Hanoi saw it otherwise. Th e communists would not be defl ected
from their central objective, reunifi cation. On the day following John-
son’s address, Pham Van Dong responded with the Politburo’s terms:
the United States must observe the Geneva accords, withdraw its forces,
cease attacks on the DRV, and sever its ties to the Saigon government.
Th e people of South Vietnam would settle their own future, and even-
tually all Vietnamese would decide on reunification of the nation.
Eff ectively, then, the communists insisted on the terms earlier framed
by the National Liberation Front, which Johnson had made clear he
would not accept.
For the better part of the next three years, the two sides tried to com-
municate through intermediaries and a process of signaling that led to
ambiguity and confusion. Messages via third parties involved extended
delay, caused misunderstanding or—worse—aroused suspicion of bad
faith, or simply never elicited an answer. In response to an early
bombing pause in May 1965, the North Vietnamese indicated to the
French that they would not make American acceptance of their condi-
tions a prior condition for talks; they wanted another Geneva-type con-
ference, and they would not demand that American troops leave the
South until negotiations were completed successfully. Th e French never
received an American reply. Once the bombing raids resumed, the
North Vietnamese made clear they would not talk, even through inter-
mediaries, unless the attacks ceased unconditionally.
In summer 1967, the North Vietnamese indicated fl exibility on a
timetable for American withdrawal and a willingness to delay reunifi ca-
tion. Rather than communicate directly, the communists passed along